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ABSTRACT 
FIXING THE FAILED:  AN EXAMINATION OF TERRORIST  
ORGANIZATIONS AND STATE BUILDING CAPABILITIES 
by Joshua Adam Freeman 
May 2015 
This study examines the role of terrorist organizations in failed states.  In 
particular, their ability to perform positive state-building activities that result in stability 
is investigated.  Both terrorism and state failure present unique and serious threats to 
international security.  However, there is very little literature concerning the positive 
effect terrorist organizations can have in failed states.  Presented is not only an 
investigation of the linkages between state failure and terrorism, but also a new 
classification of terrorist organizations based upon their ability to state-build in failed 
states.  These organizations are classified by their ability to provide goods and services 
within the state, become a legitimate sovereign, and provide security from both domestic 
and international threats to the citizens of the state in the process of filling either capacity, 
legitimacy, and security gaps.  From this a tiered classification is built.  The FARC, 
Hezbollah, and LTTE are examined to ascertain their ability to complete these tasks.  
Results show that the FARC is unable to fill any gaps, Hezbollah all three, and the LTTE 
only one.  Results suggest that there are indeed terrorist organizations that have the 
capacity to perform positively.  The new classification system allows for study of terrorist 
organizations that evaluates them on their constructive abilities, an often overlooked 
dimension of their existence.  Using this system, new policy to combat the rising terrorist 
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threat and the instability surrounding state failure can be developed and put into place to 
bring about a more security international system.      
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis investigates the relationship between failed states and terrorist 
organizations.  In particular, the ability of terrorist organizations to engage in positive, 
state-building activity in failed states is examined.  Such examination leads to the 
creation of a new classification system for terrorist organizations based upon these 
abilities rather than those attributes relied on by other classifications, such as ideology, 
area, and fatality rates.  Such a classification allows for the development of new, more 
strategic policy geared towards eliminating the support base of these organizations rather 
than engaging them in physical combat in an attempt to eradicate them.     
The primary objective of this study is to reveal whether or not terrorist 
organizations can act in a positive manner.  To accomplish this goal, terrorist 
organizations are evaluated and scored on their ability to meet certain criteria for each of 
the gaps presented in the Call (2010) model of state failure.  From such evaluation, a new 
classification of terrorist organizations is constructed.  As the terrorist organizations are 
evaluated and classified, a more intimate knowledge is offered that provides the means to 
better understand the role of terrorist organizations within their states and the 
international system.  An investigation of their constructive capabilities provides insight 
that studies that simply evaluate their destructive abilities are unable to offer. 
I argue that some terrorist organizations are indeed able to act in a positive 
manner.  Though this activity does not forgive their use of violence against innocent 
civilians, it shows that they are capable of performing a number of functions and that 
their classification based upon their tactics and fatality rates alone may be inappropriate.  
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This thesis calls for a closer look at these organizations and argues that there is more to 
them than meets the eye.  Further, the rush to label such organizations as inherently evil 
has produced ineffective policy and created averse attitudes in global politics that are 
detrimental to securing peace for all citizens of the world.  Noted during the course of 
this investigation is that state sponsorship of these organizations is helpful, but not the 
most influential factor pushing these organizations towards taking positive action.   
There is a distinction between terrorist organizations and NGOs such as the Red 
Cross that must be made, outside of the obvious.  The use of coercive force and violence 
allows terrorist organizations to be more successful at influencing substantive change 
within a state.  The failures of NGOs to stabilize failed states in Africa are numerous, and 
this is often attributed to their inability to use force.  The investigation of terrorist 
organizations’ abilities to act in a state-building manner becomes important due to their 
distinct use of violence as a coercive tool for this reason.  
 In the context of this thesis, a failed state is a state that cannot provide the most 
basic of goods, services, and security to its citizens at even minimum levels and has lost 
the ability to control its internal affairs.  When presenting original data, the Fragile States 
Index is referenced to draw a list of failed states.  Terrorist organizations are any 
organization that targets innocent civilians with the intent of coercing someone else into a 
political activity.  Data regarding terrorist attacks is drawn from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) published by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism.   
  The study proceeds as follows.  In Chapter II, the phenomena of state failure is 
explored and analyzed.  Literature regarding the definition of state failure, the 
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relationship of state failure to civil war and revolution, the causes of failure, and 
appropriate modeling of state failure are analyzed.  This chapter also thoroughly explains 
the choice to use the Call model as a basis for our understanding of state failure in 
attempts to build a classification of terrorist organizations.  Analytic treatment is also 
given to each of the three gaps as well as the provision of examples of what states fall 
into each of the gaps, and which fall into multiple gaps.   
Chapter III provides an overview of terrorism and terrorist organizations, and 
their relation to state failure.  First, a concrete definition of terrorism is laid forth as to 
clearly define what constitutes a terrorist organization and what does not.  From here, the 
causes of terrorism are explored and analyzed, and their relation to state failure 
extrapolated upon.  The rest of the chapter is devoted to examining terrorist organizations 
and goods and services provision within states, both failed and not, and the relationship 
between terrorism and failed states.  The latter is accomplished through analysis of 
terrorist incidents per year cross referenced with listings from the top 10 in the Fragile 
States Index. 
Chapter IV provides an overview of the classification system to be presented.  
Each of the criteria that must be met to fill each of the gaps are explained and detailed 
and the build of the classification is presented.  Along with each criterion is an example 
of a terrorist organization that has fulfilled, or is currently fulfilling, the criteria.  The 
remainder of the chapter is devoted to discussing the build of the classification system.  
The tiered structure of the classification is set forth and detailed. 
Chapter V presents case study of various terrorist organizations and their abilities 
to fill each of the gaps.  The terrorist organizations The Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
  
4
Columbia (FARC), Hezbollah, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are 
provided as case study.  Using these organizations the classification system is put to 
practical use and demonstrates its appropriateness and effectiveness.  Chapter VI 
provides the conclusions of the thesis and prospects for future research.   
Results of the study show that the FARC fills no gaps, Hezbollah is able to fill all 
three gaps, and the LTTE is able to fill one.  Of these three, Hezbollah stands to do the 
most good for citizens of the state in which they exist.  This is not to say that their use of 
terrorist tactics is good, but their provision of services to the people of Lebanon is.  The 
result associated with Hezbollah shows that terrorist organizations can act in a positive 
capacity and do good for the state.  This is not a remark to the inherent good or evil 
surrounding the decision to commit acts of terrorism, however.      
Using the operational understanding of the classification presented, it is hoped 
that more research into the abilities of terrorist organizations is conducted in the future.  
Through such an intimate understanding of what is considered one of the most grave 
threats to international security, policy makers worldwide have at their disposal 
information that allows for competent and effective policy solutions to the threat of 
terrorism worldwide.        
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CHAPTER II 
STATE FAILURE 
 This chapter introduces state failure.  Due to its use as a classifying mechanism it 
is a key component of this study.  The particular model used is clearly laid out and its use 
as a classifier explained to provide foundations for commentary in later chapters.  
Discussion on the definition of state failure, its difference from civil war and revolution, 
its causes, and an appropriate modeling as well as explanation of the model’s components 
is offered.  The role of poverty, corruption, resource wealth, infrastructural issues, 
governmental structure, and ethnic tensions in state failure are investigated.  
What is State Failure? 
State failure is the collapse of a state’s political structure that leads to an inability 
to promote rule and law (King and Zeng 2001).  The state loses the ability to act as 
expected and becomes engulfed with internal turmoil.  State dissolution leads to state 
predation, the state’s loss over the use of legitimate coercive power, and the inability, or 
unwillingness, to provide citizens with basic security, positive political goods, and 
services (Bates 2008; Boas and Jennings 2007; Rotberg 2003).  Once political rule and 
order have dissipated and the state no longer cares for its citizens, it fails.  
State predation and loss of coercive power are the key characteristics of the failed 
state (Bates 2008).  The loss of coercive power is the most important.  Issues that lead to 
state failure are numerous, but all ultimately lead to the state’s loss of control over the 
territory within its borders.  In many authoritarian regimes, the state preys on its citizens, 
exhibits widespread corruption, and fails to provide their citizens with goods and 
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services, yet do not fail.  The lack of failure is attributed to the regime’s maintenance of 
their monopoly over the use of coercive power within the territory of the state.  
 Also, unlike the Authoritarian state, failed states face increased competition 
between armed factions for control of the state.  Chowdhury and Duvall (2014) argue that 
any number of would-be sovereigns begin competing for control over the state once the 
standing regime begins to struggle.  Events in Syria during 2013 and 2014 provide 
evidence of this.  While the Assad regime fights to maintain control of the state, armed 
insurgent groups attempt to depose him and have taken territory from the state limiting 
the reach of the state’s authority.  Somalia provides further example.  No single group is 
able to control the entirety of the state and regions such as Puntland, are controlled by 
different regional powers. 
 Failed states also present unique and troublesome threats to the security of the 
international community.  Iqbal and Starr (2008) find that failed states have an impact on 
the general stability of neighboring states and the region in which they are located.  
Importantly, they argue that failure of one state can cause political unrest among the 
citizens of a neighboring state.  Ungovernable territories such as these offer the necessary 
environment for transnational terrorist organizational development consisting of a 
network of safe-havens and the inability of police and military forces to effectively 
combat these organizations out of the state (Patrick 2007; Piazza 2008).  The attacks of 
September 11, 2001 led to the realization that transnational terrorist organizations are a 
grave and pressing threat. 
  
 
Figure 1. Incidence and Prevalence of Political Instability Worldwide, 1955
“A Global Forecasting Model for Political Instability” by Goldstone et al. 2005, State 
Failure Task Force.  Copyright 2005 by Jack Goldstone
author. 
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Between 1955 and 2003, the number of new instances of state failure fluctuated 
(Figure 1).  There was little to moderate fluctuation, ranging from zero to eight new cases 
in any given year.  However, the percent of total states facing instability is more 
important.  There is a steady incline with peaks from the mid-1960s to 1970s and again in 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s with a sudden drop going into the 2000s.  A low of 5% 
in 1955 ranged to a high of nearly 30% in the early 1990s.  There are a number of 
explanations for why there were sudden rises and declines, but exploring these is outside 
the scope of this study.  This points out that state failure plagues a number of states, even 
if only for short amounts of time. 
 Goldstone et al. (2005) also find that nearly 60% of instability events occurred 
within two geographic regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East and South Asia.1  
Of all instability episodes between 1955 and 2003, 34.8% occurred in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and 22.7% in the Near East and South Asia.  While other regions suffer instability, 
these two regions appear to be particularly troubling.  In particular, instability events in 
Africa have led to the massacre of millions of innocent civilians in the midst of severe 
civil war in a number of states.  Instability has also become prevalent in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Syria in the last decade leading to the outbreak of civil wars and internal strife.                
Problematically, a large portion of the studies regarding failed states are aimed at 
prediction and policy solutions rather than systemically exploring the issue to explain it 
(Bates 2008; Patrick 2007).  This chapter uses available literature to present a clear image 
of the conditions surrounding state failure as well as present a conceptualization that 
                                                 
1
 For purposes of the study, the Near East and South Asia were treated as one geographic region. 
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allows us to accurately explore not only state failure, but also to provide the means to 
develop policy solutions that are so vehemently desired.   
Civil War, Revolution, and Failed States 
Civil war is less a cause of state failure than a secondary consequence of the 
factors that induce failure.  Although many failed states are rife with civil conflict that is 
exacerbated by ethnic, religious, linguistic, or some other enmity between communities, 
one must be careful not to assume that civil war is an intrinsic trait of state failure (Potter 
2014; Rotberg 2002a; Rotberg 2003).  Tensions such as these do make it more likely that 
state-breaking conflict will occur. 
 Throughout history, states have experienced large-scale civil war yet did not fail 
during the war or in its aftermath.  For example, the American Civil War did not bring 
the United States to the precipice of state failure – in fact, quite the opposite happened.  
The United States maintained control, and in the aftermath of the war, quickly 
reassimilated those states that had seceded.  Ndulu et al. (2007) find in study of African 
states that there are many cases in which the state failed without the presence of civil war 
before, during, or after failure.  This is a surprising finding.  Because there are a number 
of similar causes of civil war and state failure, expectation is that civil war would be 
present in a majority of failed states.  The answer to this puzzle is quite simple, however.  
While the conditions may be favorable for civil war to take place, there is a chance it will 
not happen or that there is an antecedent variable preventing its start.  
 Political revolution and state failure are not intertwined either.  The two are 
separated from similarity on the most basic of levels.  Failure is the state’s fall into 
disorder while revolution within the state is for the creation of new order.  Skocpol 
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(1979) argues that revolutions are attempts to reshape the models of state production in 
an attempt to enrich the state.  This is a difference that must be noted as revolutions take 
place in multiple states without failure occurring.  Egypt underwent a revolution in 2011 
to ouster the standing regime and replaced it with a new, democratically elected regime.  
During the revolution, the state was not in any threat of failure.  However, in the case of 
both revolution and failure, a state may see an explosion of violent activity.  We cannot 
assume they are correlated with one another, however.  
Civil war stems from similar issues that bring about state failure.  Because of this, 
many studies of state failure are heavily inclusive of literature on civil war.  The use of 
this literature allows for not only the development of new theories about state failure to 
be built, but to also provide further insight into political instability.  Without this 
literature, the study of state failure would not be as progressed as it is and would most 
likely produce trivial results.  Political revolution should not be associated with failure 
because the goal of revolution is to establish a new, more legitimate order while failure is 
the state’s fall into disorder. 
Harbingers of Instability 
  When evaluating the causes of state failure, three broad categories must be 
examined; economic, governmental, and social issues.  Economically, GDP, GDP per 
capita, and resource wealth in states is examined.  Studies look to the structure of the 
government and the regime type, corruption within the state, and the overall 
infrastructural stability when evaluating governmental causes.  Social issues such as 
ethnic tensions are also taken into account.  Any of these issues, or any combination 
thereof, may produce instability that can lead to the failure of a state.   
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 Poverty and political instability have a strong relationship.  During state failure, 
economic and living conditions rapidly decline for the inhabitants of the state (Rotberg 
2002a; 2002b).  There is an increased likelihood that the state will face instability that can 
lead to failure as per capita income falls (Goldstone et al. 2005; Sambanis and Hegre 
2006).  Fearon and Laitin (2003) concur, as they find that a drop of $1,000 in per capita 
income is met with a 42% increased chance of civil war breaking out and Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) argue that as the gap widens between the rich and the poor instability is 
more likely.  As citizens’ income drops, they become desperate and can easily be 
attracted to anti-government groups that are able to offer them prospects for a more 
bearable life and a promising future. 
 Poverty of the state itself is also troubling.  States that are impoverished find 
themselves unable to adequately pay civil servants, the military, and police forces leading 
to their loss of coercive power within the state (Bates 2008).  Without the loyalty of 
military or police forces, the state is helpless but to watch as other would-be sovereigns 
begin to encroach and claim loyalties that are lost.  Once loyalties begin to shift, the 
standing regime of the state begins to self-implode and what were once solid 
underpinnings of the state become severely weakened.  While not a case of state failure, 
Egypt provides a perfect example of this.  Even though extremely corrupt, Hosni 
Mubarak was able to retain political power for a period of time.  He lost the loyalties of 
the police and military forces in 2011 and was soon after removed from office and 
replaced. 
 Resource wealth within a state may also lead to stability issues.  Resource rich 
states face both a heightened risk of civil war, and the likelihood of long and drawn out 
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conflict is increased if civil war is to break out (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Ross 2004).  Nuedorfer and Theuerkauf (2014) provide evidence to support 
this as they find that gains from resources are likely to accrue disproportionately to 
certain groups while others are forced to extract the resources with little or no personal 
gain. Economic inequality within a state will rise and, as the state hordes the revenues 
from the resources without properly distributing them, the state income will concentrate 
with only the elites of the state and plunge the poor even further into poverty.  Fjelde 
(2009) argues that corrupt channeling of resource wealth does provide the circumstances 
in which opposition groups are able to easily recruit and grow.  With revenues 
aggregating so disproportionately, the shadow of instability looms ominously over the 
state.  
These resources become even more valuable during conflict as they allow the 
state to maintain a position of superiority and, if opposition movements take control and 
manage them, the income necessary for continued engagement with the state flows into 
their coffers.  Naturally, the more valuable the resource, the more likely that conflict 
surrounding it will arise.  Many states have access to resources such as ferrous metals, 
gemstones, and oil, for example.  These resources constitute a large portion of the state’s 
income.  Problematically, a small portion of the population often take control of the 
revenues accrued from these resources.    
Of all valuable resources, petroleum provides the most potential for civil conflict 
and instability (Fearon 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003).  Thies (2010) confirms this and 
argues that oil exports stand apart from state capacity, unlike many other tested primary 
export resources.  Furthermore, oil is the only resource that has an effect on the 
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likelihood of civil war.  This is attributed to a number of factors.  First, states with oil are 
often much less reliant on their citizens for financial support and are able to rule more 
repressively without major consequence (Bates 2008).  Also, because there is high global 
demand for oil, much more so than most ferrous metals or gems, states are sure to amass 
impressive profits and, if mismanaged or handled by corrupt hands, tensions are sure to 
increase within the state. 
As the political structures of the state degrade, corruption spreads nearly 
uncontrollably.  In a number of failing states, leaders begin subverting democratic norms, 
discriminating against some groups while showing favor to others, and using their power 
to levy resources for their personal use, and use their power to make the lives of those 
they rule miserable (Bates 2008; Rotberg 2002b).  Moreover, as corruption spreads, the 
amount of social welfare offered by the state begins to rapidly decline, and state aid to the 
needy ceases (Fredriksson and Svenson 2003).  The corruption of both national and local 
political leaders leads to a decreased interest in the welfare of the citizenry of the state 
and instills greed that ensures that the lives of the political elite are comfortable while the 
rest of the citizens of the state struggles to survive.  
Corruption, however, does not exist solely at the top of the political structure, it 
trickles down riddling the entire structure with corruption.  As corruption spreads and 
eventually infects the ranks of the police and military, the citizens become victim of state 
predation and are offered very few, if any, protections.  In Somalia, Mohammed Farrah 
Aidid would send his personal guard and militia to secure supply drops from the United 
Nations to keep it away from citizens to be used as a mechanism of social control.  When 
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the government starts denying citizens access to resources necessary for survival, 
tensions rise and the foundations of the state begin to buckle under pressure. 
Regimes lose their legitimacy and citizens of the state begin to lose faith in state 
institutions.  The state’s ability to properly function as a protectorate and provider is 
questioned as corruption continues to spread.  Choi (2011) argues that as citizens lose 
faith in the state, there is a higher chance that they will join terrorist organizations or 
some other type of separatist movement that opposes the state.  Naturally, as more 
opposition movements rise to challenge the regime, the less stable the foundations it 
stands on become.  Loss of legitimacy bring about intense challenges to the authority of 
the state that exposes further corruption and/or provides the conditions for total political 
upheaval.       
Cruz-Coke (2001) finds in study of Latin American states, that as public 
satisfaction in the state dropped, it became much more likely that the state would face 
some sort of stability issues.  Drops in satisfaction only have profound effects on 
democratic regimes, though.  Authoritarian leaders often maintain their power through 
force and political repression while democratic leaders rely on the people for support to 
continue holding their offices, and through those offices, their power.  Through use of the 
Polity index, Hegre et al. (2001) argue that both strong autocracies and strong 
democracies are much less likely to face instability issues than states that fall into the 
median categories, otherwise known as anocracies.2  These states have an inherent 
instability about them already and often lack the necessary infrastructure to ward off 
instability. 
                                                 
2
 Polity is complied and produced by The Center for Systemic Peace. 
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In anocracies, even if the government is democratic or transitioning to a 
democracy, there is still some probability that they are restricting the political freedoms 
of their citizens.  Abadie (2006) finds that a lack of political freedom is significantly and 
positively correlated with the chances of an increased terrorist presence within a state.  
Taking this as a proxy for oppositional movement against the established state 
government, one sees that political repression does have an effect on the stability of the 
state.   
Oppositional movements arise in a number of states but many are too small to be 
significant, or lack the resources needed to engage the state long term.  When one of 
these groups begins using terrorism or guerrilla warfare as a tactic to claim territories and 
influence politics within the state, the state faces a more significant challenge than just 
appeasing upset citizens.  Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) find in study of terrorist 
organizations that territorial control makes the organization much more lethal, and gives 
them the ability to oppose the state in drawn out conflict.  Without appropriate military 
and police forces, the state cannot fight them off.  As the state loses control over its 
territory and allows outside invaders or domestic enemies to take it, the state’s sphere of 
influence shrinks and it loses control. 
With the foundations of the state failing, numerous infrastructural issues begin to 
surface.  Either the infrastructure crumbles or it is taken over by non-state actors.  The  
lack of roads, rail lines, and telephone and postal communications begin to plague the 
state (Englehart 2009).  A multitude of challenges arise due to these issues.  First, the 
ability of the state to deploy troops and police to maintain law and order within its 
borders is hindered.  Central warning systems and responses to natural disasters and 
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public emergencies are also drastically impaired.  With the state unable to provide these 
services, it becomes easier for non-state actors to step in and provide for the people and 
recruit them to their cause.   
It also becomes easy for non-state groups to take control of the internal workings 
of the state and rule through various indirect channels.  For instance, the Taliban were 
able to take control of major roadways and villages throughout Afghanistan and become 
the de facto rulers of the state.  Combined with control over key resources, this allowed 
them to easily subvert the standing regime and create mass instability from within.  In the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, rebels from both inside and outside of the state have 
managed to plunder the ferrous metals, precious gems, and forests in the state.  They have 
also managed to control a number of primary transport roads that allow them to moderate 
trade of these resources and keep a government presence from interfering with their 
activities.   
With the state unable to effectively mobilize troops and the police to deal with 
crises, security is compromised.  The primary job of the state is to provide citizens with 
security from cross-border invasions, loss of state controlled territory, eliminate threats to 
domestic security and prevent crime but in failure they are unable to provide minimal 
security much less accomplish the before mentioned (Call 2010; Rotberg 2003).  States 
that are unable to repel outside invaders leave their citizens exceptionally vulnerable and 
allow for domestic and international actors to gain power and take territory.  In many 
cases, civilians are massacred or exploited by the invading forces.   
The Democratic Republic of the Congo lacks a central government and is unable 
to repel the invasions of numerous outside militant groups.  Armed groups from Burundi, 
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Rwanda, and Uganda have infiltrated the state and taken over key resources, massacred 
millions of state citizens, and control large swaths of territory through the use of violence 
and fear.  Many other failed states are also unable to combat the rise of armed rebellion 
groups that challenge the central authority of the state.   
But what induces rebellion against the state? Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue 
that it is not grievance, but greed, that will induce someone to rebel against the state.  
They argue that in societies that are poor, it is easier to entice citizens to join armed 
forces and challenge the stability of the state.  Further, as the citizens of the state become 
desperate, they are more likely to be influenced by the ideologies of local demagogues 
and hatemongers leading to anti-state activities (Krasner and Pascual 2005).  With there 
being a perceived benefit to joining anti-state movements and groups, citizens who are 
impoverished are much more likely to join even if they do not agree with many of their 
ideological stances.  
Although hatemongering serves to exacerbate existing ethnic tensions within the 
state that can lead to civil war, studies find that these tensions are not active predictors of 
the outbreak of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2004, Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  However, 
research does show that rule by a minority group that is particularly forceful and violent 
towards the majority increases the chance of state failure (Collier et al. 2007).  The 
tensions that build lead to catastrophic events such as the Rwandan Genocide.     
In many cases, minorities were chosen by colonial powers as favorites and often 
remained in power after the colonial powers withdrew.   Also, a corrupt dictator or 
authoritarian regime may have favored them.  In Iraq, the Baath regime of Saddam 
Hussein was made up of the minority Sunnis.  The regime was merciless and left the 
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majority Shia population living in fear for their lives.  Aided by the invasion of United 
States troops in 2003, the Shia began to rise up against the regime and it was eventually 
toppled, throwing the state into its current situation of on again, off again stability with 
intense conflict between the two sects.       
Failed states are states in which the central authority has collapsed and no longer 
holds the monopoly over the use of coercive force.  State failure derives from a number 
of factors.  Widespread poverty of the state and its citizens, resource wealth, a lack of 
security, infrastructural issues, and corruption provide the instability needed to cause 
failure.  Civil war is not a predictor of the state failing, but is closely associated with 
many of the ailments failed states suffer, and, as a result, a number of failed states are 
engulfed in civil war.       
Modeling State Failure 
 The study of state failure has produced a number of explanations and models.  
Problematically, many of these are inefficient and poorly suited to fully explore it and 
differentiate cases.  The last two decades saw a rush to fund research into state failure 
that has resulted in a number of theories that assume all states essentially function in the 
same way, even in failure, and have improperly clustered all states facing some sort of 
instability into a one-size-fits-all category (Boaz and Jennings 2007; Call  
2008; 2010; Patrick 2008).  Due to this, cases such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sierra 
Leone are treated as equal in their failure. This is not true, however, as each state 
experienced different shortcomings that led to their failure. 
Taylor (2014) argues that because state failure can be attributed to no single cause 
in particular, our understandings are muddled by ambiguity due to complex relationships  
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Figure 2. The Gaps and Conditions for Their Existence.  
between variables we attribute to numerous failed states throughout the world.  This 
ambiguity is enough to dismiss many of these explanations.  A list of the causes of failure 
exists but very few take the time to examine the nuances and intricacies of failure as they 
relate to individual cases.  It is proper to continue defining state failure as the collapse of 
a state’s government but the one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate.  Disambiguation 
of these states is pertinent to understanding failure and its surrounding conditions. 
 Call (2010) presents a new model of state failure using what he refers to as gaps 
to address this (Figure 2).  In his model, there are three existing gaps:  capacity, 
legitimacy, and security.  He argues that by separating states out using these gaps, we are 
able to more appropriately study them as the unique cases they are.  Each gap is separated 
from the other two, but it is possible for two or even all three of the gaps to overlap in a 
failed state.  The gaps are not conflated, but are interrelated. 
Capacity Gap
Poor economy and infrastructure
Lacking goods provision to citizens
Legitimacy Gap
Represssive
No public support
Security Gap
Wartorn
Citizens vulnerable
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 A model such as this has a number of advantages.  Separation of states by the 
gaps provides unique insight into the particular problems that plague the state.  
Disaggregation allows us to diagnose the ailment, not just the symptoms.  Further, this 
allows for new definitions and conceptualizations to arise.  As many of the current 
understandings are riddled with ambiguity, disaggregation allows for a refreshing 
examination of state failure that leads to a clearer understanding of the phenomenon and 
each individual, unique case. 
The Gaps 
 Each of the gaps presents a set of unique circumstances.  One must be careful to 
note, however, that there are cross-gap symptoms that could cause failure.  This section 
explores each of the three gaps and provides examples of states that are in or have been in 
the gap.  Later, analysis of the crossover between the gaps is performed.  Just because a 
state falls within a gap does not mean it is failed or failing.   However, all failed or failing 
states will fall into one or more of these gaps.3   
Capacity 
 The capacity gap refers to the state’s ability to render political goods and services, 
maintain infrastructure, and maintain economic stability.  All states are expected to 
provide certain political goods and services to their citizens to at least a minimal degree, 
such as: social welfare, medical care, food, water, open participation in democratic 
elections, and access to roads, highways, and railways.  According to Call (2010)’s 
                                                 
3
 To place states in each of the gaps, Call (2010) employs various methods to rate states.  For the capacity 
gap he uses immunization rates, for legitimacy a combination of political rights and freedoms and Polity,  
and for security a measure of conflict and its intensity.  While I have reservations about some of these 
measures, and due to a lack of time and resources, I accept his rankings and employ them to place states 
within the correct gaps.  To account for my reservations, I compare these rankings with those of the Fragile 
States Index to examine whether the weakest states appear in any of Call’s rankings.   
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rankings, states such as Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Somalia are the top three states in 
the capacity gap.       
 In the late 1980s many of the highways and trade routes in Afghanistan were 
controlled by a number of different warlords.  The state had no control over these routes.  
By holding such integral pieces of state infrastructure, the warlords were able to stagnate 
the state economy by seizing all trade goods and even people from these routes.  They 
were able to restrict aid and relief to the most rural areas of the state by controlling 
roadways, leaving citizens highly impoverished and in desperate situations.  The citizens 
were left to fend for themselves with no help from the state.  It was not until the Taliban 
took over in the 1990s and secured all these routes and unified them under their control 
that everyone had access, for a toll, of course.   
 Another example is Somalia. Although there is a standing state government in 
Somalia, it has little to no control within the borders of the state.  Chowdhury and Duvall 
(2014) point out that local tribes serve as the sovereign authorities and rule various 
regions from within, such as Somaliland and Puntland.  The state government is unable to 
control the capital of Mogadishu, let alone the entirety of the state.  Access to roads, 
railways, communications, and much more are out of the state’s control.  The state is 
unable to provide goods and services to the citizens living within these regions, but the 
regional sovereigns do, to some extent.  This serves not only to place the state in the 
capacity gap, but also within the legitimacy gap as there is credible challenge to the 
legitimacy of the state government. 
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Legitimacy 
The legitimacy gap occurs when the state government is no longer viewed as the 
authority within the state’s borders.  Authority within the state derives from the 
monopoly over the legitimate use of coercive force within the state’s borders (Weber 
1964).  The state’s loss over the legitimate use of coercive force leads to loss in 
legitimacy and control within the state.  As the state government loses control, the 
stability of the state wanes and legitimacy comes into question.   
Corruption also overtakes the state and the citizens lose confidence in the ability 
of the standing regime to competently and fairly rule.  In a large number of failed states, 
leaders become tyrannical and despotic, and use their power to keep themselves wealthy 
while repressing others.  Call (2010) argues that the legitimacy gap emerges when leaders 
begin operating outside the regulations of their power and begin disproportionately 
distributing wealth and resources.  The legitimacy in question is internal, not external.4  
While external legitimacy is key for acting in the international system, it is not of great 
importance to rule within a state and this study focuses on the internal variety. 
According to Call’s rankings North Korea is the least legitimate state.  North 
Korea, however, is not a failed state nor is it in the process of failing.  A lack of 
legitimacy can spark internal uprising that would lead to the overthrow of the state, or as 
we see in Somalia, regional sovereigns appearing and ruling on their own without 
influence or interference from the state.  Many Authoritarian states lack internal 
legitimacy yet do not fail.  Their ability to continue holding the monopoly over the use of 
                                                 
4
  Internal legitimacy is legitimacy granted by the people within the state.  External is legitimacy granted by 
other sovereign nations to recognize an actor as capable of performing activities expected of an established 
state.    
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legitimate coercive force and their claim to sovereignty counteracts the lack of 
legitimacy.   
The presence of mass protests and anger towards a regime signals a legitimacy 
gap.  The defection of military and police personnel can cement the gap and bring about 
the fall of the state.  Egypt serves as a perfect example of this.  Nepstad (2013) argues 
that the Egyptian military and police, when deployed by Mubarak to put down the 
protests, instead protected protestors from police brutality, and then, when deployed at a 
later date, refused to shoot at protestors.  Eventually, the military pulled their support 
from the Mubarak regime and sided with the protestors.  At this point, Mubarak fled from 
the state and the military took control.  With the entire institution shifting loyalties, the 
regime had no way to enforce their idea of order upon the protestors.  This particular 
example shows a legitimacy gap appearing and disappearing within a short period of 
time.  Forays into this gap can be extended over a number of decades though. 
Security 
The security gap refers to a state’s inability to provide its citizens with minimal 
security and its inability to safeguard its borders from domestic and transnational enemies 
(Call 2010).  States in this gap are often subject to long and drawn out conflicts that leave 
the state and its citizens vulnerable.  Threats to the security of the state arise from both 
domestic and international threats.  They range from invading enemy armies, to private 
militias, and armed resistance groups.  When the state is no longer able to effectively 
protect citizens of the state from threats such as this, the state enters into the security gap. 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a state that has failed in many aspects.  
Its record of providing security is more atrocious than its overwhelming lack of goods 
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and services to citizens.  Regularly, armed domestic and international groups kill 
civilians, plunder resources, and control roads and other means of transportation.  The 
state has no ability to provide defense against these groups at all.  Similarly, the Somali 
state government is unable to defend and police the capital of Mogadishu, let alone the 
entirety of the state’s territory.      
Afghanistan serves as another example.  Both before the Taliban took over and 
after their overthrow by the United States, Afghanistan was subject to the control of 
various warlords.  Citizens were subject to their desires and were offered no protections 
from their indiscretions.  The Taliban did not treat them as well as would be expected by 
a state government, but they did provide basic protections and took control from the 
warlords unifying much of the state.  
The three above mentioned states rank as the top three most insecure states (Call 
2010).  There is a gross lack of security provided to citizens and in some cases the state is 
preying on them.  Just because the state has a standing military and police force it does 
not exempt itself from the security gap.  If these institutions are weak and their loyalties 
are ephemeral, it becomes easy for the state to lose control and become insecure.          
Not Conflated, but Interrelated 
 Each of the gaps has an identity that is separate from the other two.  This does not 
imply that there is not a relationship between the gaps or that they don’t share similar 
onsets, however.  In fact, there is reason to assume that the presence of one gap will elicit 
the appearance of another in the future if not addressed properly.  Briefly, these 
relationships are discussed.  This crossover is not important in terms of scoring criteria 
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for filling each of the gaps as presented later, but this does provide insight into how state 
failure grows into a larger problem as time goes by and it is left unchecked. 
 The capacity gap is an inability to provide goods and services and maintain 
infrastructure at even minimum levels.  This leads to widespread poverty, dissatisfaction, 
and anger.  It becomes harder for the state to maintain the status quo and keep the citizens 
of the state satisfied as conditions such as these arise.  If the citizens resort to rebellion, or 
even appeal to an outside source for help, the security of the state becomes ineffective 
and compromised.  With the state engaging its own citizens, it becomes easier for an 
outside invading force to move in, such as in the Congo.  As the state is unable to fulfill 
its role as a provider, citizens will begin to question its legitimacy, and even challenge it.  
As a new would-be sovereign rises to face the standing regime, legitimacy is put into 
question and the state can enter into a legitimacy gap.  If left unchecked, it is easy for a 
capacity gap to induce other gaps in the state as well. 
 As the state becomes less legitimate and corruption begins swirling, the state can 
stop providing citizens with goods and services and begin hoarding resources for their 
personal use to ensure their own safety.  As the legitimacy of the state declines, it 
becomes much more likely that an internal, or even external force will engage in warfare  
with the standing regime to become the sovereign within the state, much the same as the 
Taliban in Afghanistan.  There is also the threat that external states, mainly global 
superpowers who send aid money to states, will pull their support and quit providing 
resources, plunging the state into a severe capacity gap if the state is reliant on that aid. 
 As the security gap widens in a state, the state potentially cannot provide goods 
and services to its citizens.  As threats arise and begin taking territory and resource 
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wealth from the state, there is little it can do to provide for citizens.  The corruption 
reduces goods provisions as leaders begin to protect their own instead of the state and 
hoard resources for their private use.  In turn, citizens begin questioning the legitimacy of 
the state and its competence to rule.  Therefore, the security gap has provided the 
instability needed to open both a capacity and legitimacy gap.   
 The amount of interrelation between the gaps is alarming.  Importantly, however, 
we must remember that a state can still reside in a capacity gap without once facing 
another of the gaps, and vice versa.  This relationship must be noted due to the impact 
they can have outside of their own set of symptoms.  Through an understanding of the 
relationships between the gaps the significance of each gap is drawn more into focus.  
Realizing that each of these gaps can set the conditions for another to open, the 
importance of policy to eliminate a gap within a state before conditions become worse 
and the state faces two or even all three gaps at once becomes abundantly apparent.   
Conclusion 
State failure poses grave threats on both the domestic and international level.  As 
states are unable to maintain internal stability, their neighbors can face instability issues 
and a number of global security threats can arise.  Through Call’s model of state failure, 
we are allowed the opportunity to view each case of failure as unique and exclusive.  
Using this we can formulate competent policy to combat the symptoms that arise with 
each of the gaps and address them before they grow too large.  
The Call model is used and repurposed for the task of building a classification of 
terrorist organizations based upon their ability to fill these gaps.  Throughout the study, 
various criteria are set forth that a terrorist organization can meet to be classified with an 
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ability to fill it.  It is neither the purpose nor intention of this study to produce a new 
model for state failure, but instead to use an existing model to further our understanding 
of both state failure and terrorists in the failed state. 
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CHAPTER III 
TERRORISM AND THE FAILED STATE 
 NGOs such as the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) operate worldwide.  They, however, have not had 
long-lasting, positive results.  A number of NGOs attempt to aid failed states but often 
fall short of accomplishing their goals (Zaidi 1999).  Problematically, these organizations 
lack the ability to use coercive force in order to enforce their agenda, and are constrained 
by the limitations the host state places upon them.  Terrorist organizations do not face this 
issue however.  They are freely able to use violence to further their agenda.  The lack of 
constraints regarding violence makes these organizations more likely to be taken 
seriously within state politics and draws the focus of this study.       
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce terrorism and its relation to state 
failure.  First, a clear and concise definition of terrorism is offered as to build an 
understanding of what a terrorist organization is.  Next, an overview of some of the root 
causes of terrorism and their similarities to the causes of state failure is provided.  The 
ability of terrorist organizations to provide positive political goods to the citizens of the 
state is also analyzed.  The chapter concludes with an investigation of terrorism in failed 
states and implications not only for this study, but also future research surrounding the 
relationship between two topics.   
Terrorism and the Terrorist Organization 
The study of terrorism has resulted in a plethora of definitions of terrorism.  For 
this thesis, an amalgam of the definitions offered by Ganor (2010) and Primoratz (2013) 
is employed.  Primoratz argues that terrorism is an act of violence, or threat of its use, 
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against innocent people, to coerce another person into an action they might not otherwise 
take.  Ganor shares this view but adds that all terrorist acts are motivated by a political 
goal.  By combining key aspects of their definitions, the result is that terrorism is the 
deliberate use of violence against innocent people with the intent of intimidating some 
other person/s into a course of political action in which they would otherwise not take.  
The targets do not have to die, they simply must be attacked.    
Importantly, this definition provides that there are two targets of a terrorist attack, 
a direct and indirect target.  The direct target is the innocent people attacked and the 
indirect are those that the terrorists are trying to coerce into a political act (i.e. a politician 
or ruler).  There must also be a political motive behind the attack.  Attacks attempting to 
accomplish goals such as extorting money are simply criminal acts, not terrorism (Enders 
et al. 2011).  This is not to say that terrorists do not engage in criminal activities, just that 
these activities are not terrorism, even if perpetrated by terrorist organizations.  However, 
once a criminal organization commits a terrorist act, they are no longer simply criminals.   
 Terrorist attacks take on one of two primary distinctions, domestic and 
transnational.  Domestic terrorism is a home-directed act of terrorism that involves only 
the members of the state involved while transnational attacks involve the citizens of 
multiple states, regardless of the attack location and nationality of the terrorists involved 
(Santifort et al. 2012).  This is an important distinction to be made as it influences attack 
types, targets, and the motivations behind the attacks.  Although the overwhelming 
majority of terrorist attacks are domestic in nature, a great deal of the research done into 
terrorism focuses on transnational terrorist incidents. 
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 Organizations approach the decision to commit a terrorist act with goals such as 
regime changes, policy change, self-determination and autonomy, social revolution, and 
maintenance of the status quo in mind (Acosta 2014; Kydd and Walter 2006).  The LTTE 
in Sri Lanka, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
exhibit the pursuit of such goals.  In many cases, an organization will resort to terrorist 
activity because they lack the means to nonviolently achieve their desired goals.  These 
tactics rarely accomplish the goal the organization has in mind and often serve to inflame 
tensions between opposing factions though (Acosta 2014).     
The resort to terrorist activity is due to a numerical inferiority, limited firepower, 
and a severe lack of resources in comparison to the state’s defense and national security 
apparatuses, meaning they have no other option but to engage in clandestine operations 
(Crenshaw 1983; Hoffman 2006).  Tactics of these groups include kidnappings, 
assassinations, bombings, hijackings, and suicide bombings (Enders et al. 2011).5  These 
tactics draw the ire of established state governments and international authorities while 
presenting security issues not as easily prepared for as conventional warfare.  Coupled 
with the fact that these attacks are carried out against innocent civilians, they are 
considered to be illegitimate and in violation of the rules of war.  
There is further distinction between terrorist organizations that must be addressed.  
Their goals often take on a benevolent or malevolent nature.  One must be careful, 
though, not to take these as insinuating the inherent “good” or “evil” nature of the 
organization.  This simply means that some organizations work to better the lives of a 
                                                 
5
 Suicide bombings are separated from other bomb attacks due to the death of the bomber.  Research finds 
these attacks to be much more lethal but much more costly for the terrorist organization.  Suicide bombings 
also have the advantage of having a triggerman carrying no external devices that would draw the suspicions 
of authorities. 
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community they represent while others work to secure their own political gains through 
any means necessary.   To distinguish between the benevolent and malevolent, this study 
uses Guevara (1960)’s idea that rebels must be concerned about the welfare of the people 
and must be fighting to protect and provide for them because they are supposed to 
represent the people to delineate the benevolent from the malevolent.  Malevolent groups 
fail to do this, and suffer from delusions of grandeur and the creation of their own utopian 
society.        
Hezbollah does not necessarily attack Israeli civilians because they want to 
eradicate the Israeli people.  Although some in the organization express the desire to do 
so, this is not an opinion shared by all in the organization.  Many in the organization do 
not view Israel as a legitimate state, but do not want to kill all of its citizens.  They are 
working to secure the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanese state, and are 
attempting to defend the citizens of that state through the only means they possess.  ISIL, 
however, seeks only their own political gain, specifically, that of their leaders.  To 
accomplish this, they are using terrorism to exterminate those who stand in their way or 
those they do not consider to be desirable for their new order.   
Although these malevolent organizations may possess the capabilities to fill any 
of the three gaps, their doing so is not to the benefit of the state.  It is quite often highly 
detrimental.  These organizations are considered for the purposes of classification, but 
their activities and pursuit of their goals often overshadows their capability to state build 
because their ultimate goal is state destruction and the establishment of a state only for 
those they deem worthy. 
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Terrorist organizations are groups that commit acts of violence against innocent 
people in order to force someone into a political act.  These organizations can be both 
domestic and/or transnational in their operational scope.  They employ a number of 
tactics to achieve their goals, which are political in nature.  They do commit criminal acts 
(i.e. bank robbery, money laundering, smuggling, etc.) but these activities are not 
terroristic in nature, even when committed by a terrorist organization.  Terrorist 
organizations operate on both a domestic and transnational level.  They can be 
exclusively one type or they can be both. Since the start of the Global War on Terror, a 
number of terrorist organizations have become a mixture of both because of their 
targeting of civilians within their own states as well as those from other states. There is 
also a benevolent or malevolent nature to their goals and aspirations.   
Causes of Terrorism 
Studies investigate the relationship between a multitude of variables and the 
existence of terrorist activity within a state.  These find correlation between a number of 
these and terrorist activity.6  For this thesis, however, only a few are outlined and 
analyzed because of similarities they share with the causes of state failure.  The causes 
investigated in this chapter are poverty, government type, and existing ethnic or religious 
conflict within a state.  These are overarching topics and the nuances of each are explored 
and analyzed in greater detail. 
 Investigation over the role of poverty is often included in studies regarding 
terrorism.  Although the results of these studies are mixed and sometimes conflicting, 
                                                 
6
 Commonly explored variables are poverty, education, religion, ethnic and religious tensions, 
democratization, political freedoms, and human rights.  For a review see Abadie 2006, Brockhoff et al. 
2014, Krueger and Maleckova 2004, Piazza 2006 and 2011.     
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there is a distinguishable trend that emerges that can aid in the explanation of poverty’s 
link to terrorism.  Recent research shows that poverty itself does not significantly impact 
the amount of terrorism within a state (Abadie 2006; Krueger and Maleckova 2004; 
Piazza 2006).  GDP per capita, the commonly used measure for poverty, has a minimal 
impact at best on levels of terrorism.  This should not be taken to mean that poverty does 
not provide the conditions in which terrorism becomes more likely, however.  This has 
caused researchers to investigate the underlying causes of poverty as a result. 
 Poverty does create a larger pool of potential recruits for terrorist organizations as 
well as increased support for extremism (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Piazza 2011).  In 
particular, minority economic discrimination and a lack of social welfare policy or a lack 
of adherence to such policy are both significantly and robustly related to increases in 
terrorist activity (Burgoon 2006; Piazza 2011).  For the economically underprivileged, 
aligning one’s self with a terrorist organization provides benefits that are otherwise 
unobtainable, such as access to food, water, and shelter.  Hungry and desperate, people 
are much more willing to engage in activity in which  they would not engage under other 
circumstances.   
 While poverty itself is not a significant predictor of terrorism, conditions leading 
to widespread poverty or discriminatory poverty inflame existing tensions within the state 
making it more likely that terrorism will occur.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that drops 
in GDP per capita are correlated with sharp increases in the chances of civil war 
beginning, as mentioned in the discussion of state failure.  They also find that, in the 
context of these conflicts, some people are drawn to use insurgency as a tactical choice.  
Insurgency itself does not necessarily entail terrorism, but those conducting insurgent 
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operations are often inferior to their opponent in terms of numbers and arms and must 
resort to clandestine assaults, similar to terrorist organizations. 
 The governmental structure of a state and its treatment of its citizens also have a 
significant effect on the amount of terrorism within a state.  Researchers present 
conflicting results regarding this.  Studies find that both democracies and autocracies 
have terrorism-reducing effects (Krieger and Meierrieks 2008; Wilson and Piazza 2013).  
Choi (2011) argues that the presence of strong democratic institutions within the state 
make it easy for citizens to voice grievances and settle disputes and also serves to deter 
terrorist activity.  However, this reduction is not necessarily due soley to the state being a 
democracy.  As states become more democratic, they begin to offer their citizens a wider 
array of political rights and freedoms, but states making an initial transition to democracy 
may not provide these as well as more established democracies.  Increased political rights 
and democratic participation are correlated to a decline in the number of terrorist attacks 
within the state (Abadie 2006; Krieger and Meierrieks 2008; Li 2005). 
 There are exceptions to the democracy related reduction in terrorist attacks, 
however.  Chenoweth (2013) finds that democracies that are poor, meddle in the internal 
affairs of other states, or are tied up in territorial conflict are subject to higher amounts of 
terrorist activity.  The United States is considered one of the strongest democracies in the 
world, yet were victim of the September 11, 2001 attacks over their military presence in 
the Middle East and their close relationship to a number of state leaders in the region.  
Israel is a democratic state, yet they continuously face attacks from Hamas and Hezbollah 
over their military presence in the Palestinian territory, the Golan Heights in Syria, and 
southern Lebanon.  Iraq and Afghanistan were both impoverished at the time of their 
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attempted democratization and were met with an onslaught of terrorist activity by those 
that opposed the democratic regime and its political ties to the United States.  
Afghanistan was also tied up in territorial conflict between warlords, the Taliban, and 
other insurgent groups in the state such as al Qaeda.   
Authoritarian regimes exhibit a similar trend insofar as states experience less 
terrorism the more authoritarian they become.  Wilson and Piazza (2013) find that 
varying degrees of authoritarianism are associated with decreases in terrorist attacks.  
Notably, the supreme power vested in the executive of an authoritarian regime allows for 
a quick and harsh response to terrorist activity, or other forms of political and social 
uprising.  Also, in states in which the state does not hold high regard for the lives of their 
citizens, terrorism is less likely.  Admittedly, reporting issues are potentially influencing 
this result.  Brockhoff et al. (2014) suggest that underreporting by authoritarian regimes 
leads to the belief that there is a terrorism reducing effecting when there might not be 
one.  There is no assurance of this, however, so we accept the findings regarding the role 
of authoritarianism.   
 If both democracy and authoritarianism both provide a terrorism reduction effect, 
what is happening?  We turn to the Polity IV dataset to explain this. With strong and 
established autocracies occupying the -10 to -6 range and democracies of the same 
strength occupying the 6-10 range, there is a large gap left in which many states reside.  
Our attention then must shift to the intermediary categories.  The -5 to 5 range 
encompasses those states that are transitioning from one regime type to another or are not 
fit to be categorized as either an autocracy or a democracy, and are otherwise known as 
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anocracies.  States falling into this range are more likely to be subject to domestic 
terrorist attacks, which is confirmed using data from the GTD. 
 Jackman and Treier (2008) argue that by squaring the Polity score of a state, the 
stronger autocracy or democracy a state is, the higher the score is.  Using this, an 
effective test is developed to evaluate anocracies.  While it is outside the scope of this 
study to provide any quantitative analysis regarding terrorism, this concept is still useful.  
The new scores can be used as a gauge of how stable the regimes of the state are.  When 
examining the domestic terrorist attacks from all around the world for each year, it 
becomes evident that the majority of these attacks take place in the states that have lower 
scores.  While this doesn’t serve to give any directed evaluation of democracies and 
autocracies, the information gleaned regarding anocratic states is extremely useful, and 
builds towards the notion that the states falling into the anocracies range of Polity are 
riddled with a number of problems that must be addressed.       
Even though many consider it good for a state to transition towards a democratic 
regime, these states are much more susceptible to instability, widespread corruption, and 
the emergence of state predation.  These conditions are favorable to terrorist activity.  
Terrorism is a tactical option for those preyed upon by the state and a way to stem the 
political corruption of the state by fighting back against what is perceived to be a threat to 
the well being of state citizens.   
Existing ethnic and religious tensions within a state also fuel increases in 
terrorism.  Black (2004) argues that terrorism is directed along ethnic or religious lines.  
He points out that terrorist organizations often target those of another community and the 
attacks are aimed at those with a socially higher standing in the state’s society.  
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Interestingly enough, states in which there are high numbers of domestic terrorist attacks 
each year, there was a minority group favored by the state government at some point in 
the state’s history.   
In Iraq, following the collapse of the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein, the 
majority Shia, who had been subject to systematic repression, began to lash back against 
the favored Sunnis.  Both sides have since resorted to acts of terrorism to fight each other 
leaving the state to teeter on the edge of all out ethnic civil war.  The Tamils in Sri Lanka 
provide further example.  The LTTE use terrorism against the more powerful state 
government that was repressive of the minority Tamils in the state.  Hamas also acts in 
the same capacity against the state of Israel.  Although lacking the necessary resources to 
engage in all out war with the Israelis, Hamas targets the settlers sent into the Gaza Strip 
by Israel and claims to do so on behalf of the repressed Palestinian people. 
Ethnic and religious groups become dangerous because they provide ready-made 
communities that are easy to appeal to and recruit for nefarious purposes disguised as 
altruistic, or commanded in the name of “God”.  Linberg (2008) argues that religious 
groups are especially useful because actors are more likely to carry out their assigned 
duties if others in the group share their faith.  Although ideology, both secular and 
religious, is a primary driving force and the existence of a dominant ideology in a state 
can bring about the genesis of terrorism, there is no evidence to support the notion that 
any one ideology is more likely to cause it than another (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011; 
Reynal-Querol 2002).   
While Fearon and Laitin (2003) point out that religious and ethnic tension are not 
significant predictors of civil war onset, one should be aware that they can inflame 
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grievances that lead to the use of terrorism by one group against another.  Rule by a 
particularly cruel and repressive minority population is correlated to an increased chance 
of state failure and can also be correlated with an increase in terrorist activity within the 
state.  The use of religion is still a hotly debated topic in the study of terrorism.  
Researchers are unsure of the exact impact it has, but all tend to agree that it is not a 
primary motivator of the leadership of these organizations but can influence the decisions 
of those lower in the organizational structure.   
Terrorism is caused by a number of circumstances.  This section outlines only a 
few, but these are important when discussing the links between state failure and 
terrorism.  There is crossover between the two with regards to these causes.  This outlines 
the necessity for their study together and provides significance to the taxonomy of 
terrorist organizations offered in this study.    
Terrorism and Failed States 
 Poverty, government structure, and ethnic and religious tensions are shown to be 
indicators of state failure as well as terrorism.  These similarities are too important to be 
overlooked.  Poverty, based upon lack of wealth distribution, discrimination, and state 
predation provide the necessary conditions for both state failure and terrorism to arise in 
the state.  States that fall into the intermediary rankings of the Polity dataset, and those 
that are unable to vest complete control in the executive, such as authoritarian regimes, 
and those able to ensure political rights for all citizens are more inclined to experience 
both.  Tensions along ethnic lines signal both as well as making the occurrence of civil 
war much more likely.  Although this is simply a short and fairly basic comparison of the  
 
  
 
Figure 3. Domestic Terrorist Attacks in Fragile State Index Top 10 versus the rest of the 
world. 
 
two phenomena, it is clear that there are strong similarities that point towards the 
necessity of understanding their connections.        
Piazza (2007, 2008) shows that failed states act as breeding grounds for 
transnational terrorist organizations and also, in study of nineteen Middle Eastern states,
that state failure promotes the growth of these organizations.  Failed
people the lack of a strong police force to curtail the organizations, and a nearly 
unsolvable maze of safe houses and caches 
advantage of.  Ungovernable territories such as these allow terrorist organizations to 
flourish and develop their plan of attack with minimal state interference.
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disaggregation criteria set forth in Enders et al. (2011) (Figure 3). 7  These three years are 
chosen due to an overlap in the data from both datasets.  The Fragile States Index data 
only goes back as far as 2005 while the disaggregation data presented by Enders et. al 
(2011) only stretches into 2007.  The crossover is therefore examined to gain some 
insight into the number of terrorist attacks occurring within failed states. 
In total, there were 4,041 domestic terrorist attacks in the three-year span.  During 
this time, 2,041 of these attacks were carried out in states that ranked in the top 10 of the 
Fragile States Index in each respective year of the sample.8  Across the sample these 
states accounted for an astounding 50% of all domestic terrorist attacks.  The Middle East 
is the area of operation for an impressive amount of these attacks.  In particular, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan exhibit high outputs.  Iraq and Afghanistan were attempting to 
transition to democracies after decades of authoritarian rule, making the states highly 
unstable.  Additionally, they lacked the proper infrastructure to maintain a firm grasp on 
the internal affairs of the state in this time frame.  Splinter cells of al Qaeda appeared 
within the states to combat the American presence and the establishment of a government 
that they feared would be pro-American and adverse to their cause and ideology.  
Pakistan has not failed or endured a strong American military presence, but has been 
subject to a number of corrupt state leaders and social uprising and is considered to be a 
safe-haven for many terrorist organizations.     
                                                 
7
 Domestic attacks are chosen over transnational due to amount of attacks.  By using data regarding 
domestic terrorist incidents, a larger sample is drawn. 
8
 The top 10 states from the index included a total of 13 different states with 7 states appearing all 3 years 
of the sample.  The top 10 included (Those that appeared all 3 years in italics): Afghanistan, Chad, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Cote de Ivory, Haiti, Iraq, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and 
Zimbabwe  
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Terrorist organizations not only reside in these states, they are active within them 
as well.  Also, in the sample, these states represented only a small portion of the overall 
attacks early on, but exponentially increased each year.  The presence of U.S. troops 
might explain some of this increase, but these are domestic terrorist attacks not targeted 
at the U.S. troops.  The attacks were carried out against citizens of the state, by citizens of 
the state. 
States in any of the gaps are conducive to terrorist development and intervention.  
The weakened political state allows non-state actors to interact with the citizens of the 
state and gain their support through various actions via the state’s lack of control.  As the 
dissatisfaction in the state rises, the chance that these organizations are successful within 
the state increases.  Offered is commentary regarding the reasons terrorist organizations 
would want to target states in each of the gaps.  In the next chapter, a detailed set of 
criteria that must be met for filling these gaps is offered. 
The presence of a security gap provides an enticing situation for terrorist 
organizations to exploit.  Without the ability to use military and police to actively and 
effectively root out these organizations and break them down, the state is helpless but to 
watch as they grow in size and strength and begin to wreak havoc.  Terrorist 
organizations can flourish with very little to no interference from state authorities as the 
state becomes ungovernable.  A state lacking an established and overwhelming military 
superiority allows terrorist organizations a much greater chance of accomplishing their 
goals.         
States suffering from a capacity gap are also vulnerable to terrorist organizations 
and their tactics.  Some terrorist organizations are fully capable of providing goods and 
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services the state should be providing, and are willing to do so, although not necessarily 
for altruistic motives such as Hezbollah and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.  As in 
the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, terrorist organizations can successfully secure the 
infrastructure of the state and exert control over it.  The Taliban had complete control 
over the state and was able to build a regime that kept the state stabilized until the U.S. 
military overthrew them in the early 2000s.  Such activity allows terrorist organizations 
the opportunity to subvert the state and gain legitimacy. 
Terrorist organizations find a state in the legitimacy gap to be quite enticing as 
well.  These organizations begin engaging in activities that can win over the loyalties of 
the people as the state loses support.  Providing an accepting community as well as goods 
and services allows a terrorist organization to undermine state authority and siphon away 
the legitimacy of the state and build what the people perceive to be a legitimate authority.  
Loss of legitimacy triggers concern among the international community that the state is 
not capable of acting as it is expected to and helps these organizations gain sympathy 
from the outside because they are fighting to remove those that are unwilling to take care 
of the citizens.   
 Both terrorist organizations and failed states present serious security issues for the 
international community.  Understanding that the two are closely interrelated reveals that 
together they present a much more severe threat.  There are striking similarities between 
the two phenomena.  Poverty and its underlying conditions, the type of government and 
whether there is corruption and repression, and existing ethnic tensions within a state 
induce both.  The relationship between the two is significant and further research must be 
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devoted to it.  Terrorist organizations flourish in the absence of a strong, centralized state.  
Provided any of the gaps, terrorist organizations have the potential to be successful. 
Goods and Services Provision 
When states lacks legitimacy and fail to provide their citizens with positive 
political goods and services, and security, it allows non-state actors, such as terrorist 
organizations, the opportunity to fill those gaps and gain support.  Terrorist organizations 
often provide social services such as welfare, medical care, and education as well as 
providing political action, emergence relief, and aid, while building an accepting 
community for the disenfranchised, alienated, and those with no direction in life 
(Abrahms 2008; Berman and Iannaccone 2006; and Grynkewich 2008).  Actively 
engaging in these activities allows terrorist organizations to embark on hearts-and-minds 
campaigns of sorts with the objective of undermining public support for the state and 
building a stable support base of their own.   
 Grynkewich (2008) views the provision of goods and services as a method of 
combating the state.  She argues that provision of goods serves three primary purposes: it 
challenges the legitimacy of the state by showing its failure to adhere to its end of the 
social contract, it offers the population another body in which to place their faith, and it 
allows the organization to gain a following that rewards in recruits, sympathy for their 
cause, and support of all sorts.  Engaging in such activity gives the organization the 
ability to better combat the state.  As the disparity between the state and terrorist 
organizations closes, the result is an opportunity for the organization to engage in open 
warfare with the state rather than simply relying on clandestine operations.  
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 There are other benefits to this as well.  Acosta (2014) notes that terrorist 
organizations very rarely accomplish their goals through terrorist activity alone, and they 
must somehow also integrate themselves to become part of the state’s political process.  
As they gain the support of citizens in the state, they gain legitimacy for their cause and 
are provided the opportunity to actively pursue their goals with a greater chance of 
success.  Without the ability to integrate into the political structure of the state, some 
terrorist organizations have no choice but to continue engaging in terrorist tactics as their 
primary form of engagement. 
 These tactics are much more likely to be successful in democratic states.  
Democratic states rely on the people to elect their leaders and vest power in them, and 
losses of support are highly detrimental to the state.  When examining failed states, one 
must be aware that many are not fully autocratic or democratic, and exhibit a mixture of 
the best and worst traits of each regime type.  These states, especially if more democratic, 
would suffer setbacks from losing the support of the people.  With the state prone to more 
instability than more developed regimes, losing the faith of the citizenry is a tipping point 
after which state failure may occur. 
A number of terrorist organizations engage in goods provision activities. 
Hezbollah in southern Lebanon regularly accomplishes such tasks.  Flannigan (2008) 
asserts that not only does Hezbollah hold numerous political positions within the 
Lebanese government, but they also manage highly touted medical and social service 
providers.  Shortcomings of the government of Lebanon allow Hezbollah to gain support 
of the masses by providing goods and services to citizens that they would otherwise not 
receive.  The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood provides a number of services, such as 
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healthcare, social services, and relief services to needy communities in the Palestinian 
territory (Berman and Laitin 2008). Providing security to the citizens of the state is also 
beneficial for terrorist organizations as it allows them to garner the trust and support of 
those that they protect. 
As states begin to lose control over their internal operations, terrorist 
organizations are able to step forward and complete tasks that the state fails to complete.  
In undermining the state’s authority through the provision of goods and services, terrorist 
organizations can accomplish a multitude of objectives.  Taking legitimacy away from 
the standing state government allows them the chance to assert themselves as a legitimate 
authority within the state.  The state’s loss of legitimacy is dangerous and the state will 
begin to experience some early warning signs of failure, and potentially suffer the 
outbreak of civil war. 
The role of state sponsorship is of concern when examining terrorist organizations 
and their ability to provide such goods.  A number of terrorist organizations worldwide 
have some form of state sponsorship, whether it be financial or through other tangible 
resources.  However, this state sponsorship does not necessarily entail success in regards 
to providing certain goods and services within the state.  Terrorist organizations such as 
the Glenanne Gang received some form of state sponsorship from the United Kingdom 
and al Qaeda purportedly received aid from Saudi Arabia.  Neither of these organizations 
exhibit the capacity to act in a positive, state-building manner.  This is not to say that 
state sponsorship does not influence a terrorist organization’s ability to act in such a way, 
but rather that it is not the most impactful factor.  Further, these organizations are left to 
invest the aid in whatever way they see fit.   
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Hezbollah, for example, makes a conscious effort to use this aid to provide for the 
citizens of the state as well as carry out terrorist tactics.  Hezbollah’s use of Iranian 
money is predicated on their opposition to Israel and Western ideals, and, as long as they 
maintain that ideological adherence, Iran continues to give them money.  To the contrary, 
the purported support al Qaeda received was immediately put towards terrorist attacks 
with little concern towards anything else.  Garnering state sponsorship also serves as a 
tactic for these terrorist organizations.  Through collecting aid, the organization is free to 
carry out their objective.  Due to the indirect influence, the state sponsor is not 
necessarily causing the terrorist organization to engage in positive activity.  Such activity 
is rather a result of the terrorist organization’s agenda, which is aided by revenue 
collection. 
Terrorist organizations engage in many activities that fill one, if not all, of the 
gaps.  Hezbollah’s provision of healthcare, social welfare, emergency relief, and their 
claim to seats in the state government processes allow them to act towards the filling of 
the capacity gap and legitimacy gap.  They are providing these goods at a minimal level.  
Conclusion 
Terrorism is an act of violence carried out against innocent people with the intent 
of coercing someone else into a political action they might not otherwise take.  Through 
the use of various tactics such as kidnapping, assassinations, and bombing, organizations 
are able to engage in such activity.  Any group that does so is a terrorist organization.  
These organizations do commit criminal acts such as bank robbery and extortion, but that 
does not make these actions terroristic in nature.   
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Conditions surrounding poverty, governmental structure, and ethnic tensions have 
an effect on the genesis of terrorism within a state.  These factors are eerily similar to the 
conditions that surround state failure.  The presence of terrorist organizations within 
failed states is confirmed by cross-examining the top 10 states on the Fragile States Index 
and the GTD.  In two of the three years examined over 50% of all domestic terrorist 
attacks for each respective year occurred within these states.   
Terrorist organizations are also capable of providing goods and services to the 
citizens of a state.  Through such provision they are able to challenge the legitimacy, 
security, and capacity of the state.  Such a challenge allows them the opportunity to 
involve themselves with the citizens of the state and provides a way to become involved 
with state politics.  As terrorist organizations pursue their goals in such a manner it 
becomes more likely they will achieve success. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONSTRUCTING A CLASSIFICATION 
 In previous chapters state failure and terrorism were explored as precursors to the 
development of the new classification offered by this study.  Using the Call (2010) model 
of state failure, a four-tiered classification structure is constructed.  Based upon their 
ability to fill the gaps, terrorist organizations are placed into one of the four tiers.  By 
examining their constructive abilities rather than their capability for destruction, this 
classification provides a more intimate inspection of terrorist organizations that past 
studies do not.  
 Existing classifications are predicated upon the organization’s adherence to an 
ideology, area of operations, attack types, and the target audience. An understanding of 
these aspects of terrorist organizations provides an image of the global situation 
surrounding terrorism and provides necessary insight into the activity and motives of 
these organizations.  Problematically, these classifications are not effective at evaluating 
terrorist organizations on an operational level that provides practical information 
regarding their goals, their strengths, and their weaknesses.  The classification offered 
here provides this insight. 
 This chapter is devoted to clearly outlining what criteria terrorist organizations 
must meet to fill each of the gaps, the basic structure of the classification system, and 
how organizations are to be scored using the criteria set forth in discussion of filling the 
gaps.  The largest portion of the chapter is devoted to setting the criteria for filling the 
gaps.  Three major criteria are assigned to each gap and are broken down into sub 
components.  Using these criteria and the classification structure set forth, the next  
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chapter provides case study analysis of terrorist organizations to show how the 
classification process works. 
Filling the Gaps 
 Each gap is assigned three major categories that are split up into subcategories to 
establish the criteria that must be met in order to fill the gap.  For the capacity gap, 
resource control, goods and services provision, and infrastructural control are the major 
categories.  For the legitimacy gap, ethnic similarities, ideological congruence, and 
political participation fulfill this role.  Finally, for security, the categories are military 
capabilities, policing capabilities, and territorial control within the state.  Not all 
categories are going to have subcategories, however.  For those in which it is necessary, 
the subcategories will be appropriately addressed. 
Capacity 
 To fill the capacity gap, terrorist organizations must be able to control resources 
within the state, provide goods and services to the citizens of the state, and control major 
infrastructure.  Resource control does not require subcategories, but goods and services 
and infrastructure do.  For goods and services, terrorist organizations are evaluated on 
whether they can offer medical care, social welfare, and emergence relief.  Infrastructure 
control is split into control over transportation routes such as roads, railways, or 
waterways, and control over utility providers such as power plants, hydroelectric dams, 
or some other form of utilities.   
 The control over state resources allows for the collection of income and control 
over the allocation of such resources.  The resources referenced are natural resources 
such as oil, precious metals and gems, water sources, and coal, for example.  The list of 
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resources is not limited just to these, however.  Control over any resource gives an actor, 
both state and non-state, considerable power within the state.  Also, by controlling the 
income that results from these resources, an actor is able to use the profits to provide 
goods and services to the citizens of the state, bolster the economy, or use the money for 
funding their own goals.  Because it is outside the scope of this study to provide any 
analysis on the ability of terrorist organizations to successfully fill these gaps over a long 
period of time, the use of the income is not important.  What is important is their having 
control over resources within the state. 
 In Afghanistan, when the Taliban took over they secured control over the poppy 
industry in the state.  This gave them considerable control over the economy of the state 
and the quality of life for the citizens within the state.  As with many authoritarian 
regimes, the Taliban were not so much concerned with the quality of life for their people, 
but rather bolstering the state economy to serve in their favor.  The influx of income 
allowed them to maintain control over the internal workings of the state.  In other states, 
terrorist organizations have some control over oil fields, such as ISIS in Iraq.  This brings 
them considerable income that could be used for the good of the state.  Whether this is 
used for the good of the existing state or the state they wish to build is a different story 
altogether.   
 Goods and services provision also goes towards filling the capacity gap within the 
state.  Citizens are often left wanting for basic goods and services within failed states.  
Terrorist organizations that are able to provide such goods are able to work towards 
closing the capacity gap within a state.  As goods and services are administered, the lives 
of the citizens improve and conditions become somewhat more bearable.  Provision of 
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such services as healthcare, social welfare, housing, and food distribution help fill the 
capacity gap and bring about some stability for the state. 
 Goods and services must be separated out.  While all are beneficial and provide 
aid to the citizens of the state, they are not dependent on one another.  Healthcare services 
such as the provision of doctors and medical clinics is not necessarily tied to the 
provision of food-stuffs to highly impoverished neighborhoods.  This being the case, 
terrorist organizations are evaluated on their ability to provide the following services 
individually: healthcare, welfare, food, water, and emergency relief.  It is highly probable 
that terrorist organizations that offer goods and services are offering any mixture of these.  
To be practical in analysis though, they are treated as being separate. 
 Hezbollah actively provides a number of highly touted services within Lebanon.  
In many cases, citizens of the state, especially those belonging to the Shia population, 
turn to Hezbollah for aid instead of the state.  The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood 
provides such services as well as emergency relief to the citizens of the West Bank and 
Gaza strip.  In the absence of a strong government that provides these as expected, these 
organizations have stepped up and taken the responsibility of providing for the state’s 
citizens. 
 Infrastructural control provides further opportunity for terrorist organizations to 
eliminate a capacity gap.  Control over major transportation routes is key to controlling 
the infrastructure of the state.  In holding the roadways, railways, and waterways, a 
terrorist organization is able to control trade and distribute resources throughout the state 
with minimal interference.  Provided the opportunity to regulate trade goods so that they 
are funneled into producing income or used to aid the citizens of the state, terrorist 
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organizations are able to bolster their ability to stabilize a capacity gap inflicted state and 
restore stability.  Waterways provide a unique opportunity, as these routes flow through 
various states.  The ability to tax the use of the waterway within the state provides 
another source of income that can be used to provide to the stability of the state.    
 Control over major utility providers such as electric power plants and dams.  Use 
of these utilities can increase production within the state, make the lives of the citizens 
more bearable, bolster the economy, and provide needed resources to aid in the 
development of the state.  The ability to allocate such utilities allows for further control 
over the state and can influence the perception of the terrorist organization in the eyes of 
the citizens of the state. 
 Through control of valuable natural resources, goods and services provision, and 
control over state infrastructure, terrorist organizations can fill the capacity gap.  As these 
organizations stabilize the economy, regulate the infrastructure of the state, and make the 
lives of the state’s citizens more bearable, they provide the opportunity to lift the state out 
of the capacity gap and alleviate in state stress related to the lack of such control.  
Legitimacy 
 Filling the legitimacy gap relies less on tangible issues than on sharing subjective 
similarities with the citizens of the state.  Filling the legitimacy gap is predicated on the 
terrorist organization sharing ethnic similarities to the citizenry of the state, having a 
worldview congruence, and actively participating in the political processes of the state.  
While the capacity gaps are fairly universal for all states, the legitimacy gap and its 
criteria are specific to each individual state.  This process allows for illustration of 
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situations in which the organization would both succeed and fail in an attempt to fill the 
legitimacy gap.   
 Sharing an ethnic heritage with the citizens of a state is an effective way to 
procure legitimacy from them.  Habermas argues that “the ‘we-consciousness’, founded 
on an imagined blood relation or on cultural identity of people who share a belief in a 
common origin, identify one another as ‘members’ of the same community, and thereby 
set themselves apart from the environment . . . constitute[s] the core of ethnic and 
national social formations’ (Habermas 1998; 130).  Being part of the “we” creates a 
commonality with the citizens of the state that will not go unnoticed.   
 Through this commonality with the citizens, it is much easier to claim legitimacy.  
In many cases, a citizen’s view of the authority and its legitimacy is based upon their 
reflection of the citizen’s ethnic and cultural identity (Rothschild 1977).  It is therefore 
logical to assume that an organization that matches the ethnic identity of the people they 
would govern will have a much better chance at securing their consent, and, in the 
process, legitimacy.  Furthermore, states historically have not taken well to outside 
powers or forces entering their state and claiming authority. 
 It is reasonable to assume that the FARC would not be successful in an attempt to 
gain legitimacy in Somalia.  The cultural and linguistic differences alone are enough to 
stymie any sort of attempt.  It is likely that the group would be viewed as an outside 
“imperial” power and the citizens of the state would reject their claim to authority.  
However, in Colombia the FARC are much more likely to make a successful claim to 
legitimacy.  They share a similar ethnic and cultural heritage with the citizens of the state.  
Similarly, Hamas in Palestine can and has made appeals to the ethnic similarities between 
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themselves and the people of the state to include themselves in the political processes of 
the state.  Although they defer control of the state to the Palestinian Authority (PA) they 
could easily appeal to the people and earn their consent to be ruled and legitimacy. 
 Interestingly, the Middle East in particular makes it somewhat easier for an actor 
from another state to make a successful claim for authority and legitimacy from the 
people of another state.  Many of these nations share similar ethnic backgrounds and 
trace themselves back to a similar lineage.  Therefore, an organization like Hezbollah 
could make a claim for authority and legitimacy in a Sunni dominated Middle Eastern 
state and meet less resistance than would the FARC or the LTTE.   
 Sharing a similar worldview as the citizens of the state, religious or secular, 
allows a terrorist organization to further relate to the community within the state.  This 
worldview congruence provides a relationship to the citizens of a state that goes further 
than just a similar ethnic heritage.  The two are often tied to each other in some cultures, 
but should be treated as separate and given acknowledgement if tied to one another.  
Many feel as if one’s worldview is closely associated with just religious belief.  It also 
stems from a secular ideal that resonates throughout an entire community or state.  
Research shows that ideologies are a primary, and central motivator for human (Reynal-
Querol 2002).  The same logic can be applied to strong secular belief such as Humanism 
as well.  Therefore, if a terrorist organization appeals to the ideals of the dominant 
worldview in the state, they can establish themselves and a legitimate authority with less 
of a challenge that someone from a different worldview attempting the same thing. 
  A worldview congruence serves another purpose as well.  A terrorist organization 
can advertise itself as holding a certain worldview as a means to coerce the citizens of a 
  
55
state to do as they wish.  For instance, many Islamic extremist groups such as al Qaeda 
and ISIL present themselves as purely religious Islamic organizations.  In appealing to 
the religious doctrine of the region in which they carry out their operations it is easier to 
recruit and effectively implement their plans.  This is not to say that these men are not 
religious, but instead that they might be exaggerating their religious motives to appeal to 
a wider audience.   
 Certainly, appealing to a worldview congruence (i.e. Christian or Islamic 
doctrine) will merit consent from the people in many cases.  However, a political 
ideology such as the anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment gripping large portions of 
the Middle East can easily motivate the citizens of a state to legitimate an authority who 
also has such beliefs.  For instance, the strong anti-Israeli sentiment held by Hamas 
endears them to the people of Palestine who are victim of Israeli persecution and 
repression.  Other examples of such ideology would be adherence to Communist or 
Democratic thought, or a hawkish or dovish stance in international affairs.  Such a 
political ideological congruence can influence the reception of a terrorist organization 
within a state.  By appealing to an ideological similarity, the same as a worldview 
congruence, terrorist organizations are able to act as social chameleons and build a sense 
of community with the citizens of the state.    
Political participation allows a terrorist organization to establish a foothold in the 
legitimate political processes of the state and strengthen their claim to authority and the 
legitimacy that comes with it.  Acosta (2014) argues that terrorist organizations that 
involve themselves with the political processes of the state are much more likely to 
achieve their goals via legitimate routes instead of ineffective clandestine operations that 
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have to target the citizens of the state.  As they earn a legitimate voice, their attempts at 
change gain more legitimacy and, through this, the terrorist organization becomes a more 
legitimate operator.   
 It is feasible that domestic, and some transnational terrorist organizations are 
involved with the political landscape of their home nation or others.  Often times they 
resort to terrorist tactics when they do not have a strong political voice and need to 
forward their political agenda.  For instance, Hezbollah currently holds a number of seats 
in the Lebanese Parliament and have two members in the cabinet.  They are arguably one 
of the most effective political organizations in Lebanon, as the people are very likely to 
come to them for aid instead of the state government (Wiegand 2009).  Engaging in such 
activity allows the terrorist organization a voice in the political processes, and to gain 
legitimacy that would allow for an eventual move to become the sovereign authority of 
the state. 
 Holding an ethnic similarity to the people of a state, a similar worldview, and 
involving themselves in the political processes of the state allows a terrorist organization 
to work towards filling a legitimacy gap.  By themselves becoming legitimate and 
asserting their power as a sovereign authority, the organization removes the state from a 
legitimacy gap and stabilizes the state.  Such a stabilization can be tenuous, however, and 
must constantly be maintained.   
Security     
 A security gap is difficult to fill.  It requires that an actor maintain a military force 
capable of fighting off outside threats, controlling territory within the state, and having 
the capability to police the territory that it holds to ward of internal threats.  Very few 
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non-state actors are able to provide such a credible offer of security.  Even so, terrorist 
organizations are still evaluated on their ability to close a security gap.  Territorial control 
is split into the control of territory itself and the control over major cities within the state.  
The other two criteria are self-standing and need no further separation.   
 To begin, a terrorist organization must be able to field a sizable military force.  
Provided military capabilities, terrorist organizations can engage enemies and maintain 
internal order and security.  Also, through the use of such power, they can maintain a 
firm hold on territories and cities that they have claimed through conquest.  This type of 
presence serves as a deterrent to outside invaders as well as internal groups who might 
attempt a coup. 
They must be capable of deterring outside threats as well as securing the borders 
of the state.  This entails access to weaponry, personnel, and supplies.  This is possible, 
but terrorist organizations may have to look to outside actors for help.  For instance, the 
Taliban were able to field such a military force in Afghanistan.  However, this was only 
possible due to weapons and training that were provided by the Pakistani government.  
Through this military superiority, the Taliban were able to completely control 
Afghanistan until the most powerful military in the world invaded.  Hezbollah was 
similar in their initial and continued reliance on Iran for finances and military training.     
ISIL currently holds a military force that is engaging with outside actors, but is 
not weathering well.  For a time, until states surrounding Iraq and Syria became involved 
in the fight against ISIL, the organization was effectively capturing cities and territory 
and defeating all military threats to them.  However, if examining ISIL for their military 
capabilities alone, and not their combat record against the states with whom they are 
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currently engaged, it is possible to recognize them as being able to fill a security gap.  
They are also recruiting at an alarming rate as young adults from highly developed states 
are attempting to leave their homes to join ISIL.  As to the success ISIL would enjoy after 
filling a security gap, there is no clear answer, but, as of their current engagements, there 
would be no long term hold. 
Territorial control also serves to close a security gap.  As terrorist organizations 
gain control over large swaths of territory within a state, they become responsible for its 
protection and security.  They must defend it against attempts by other actors to claim 
territory, repel outside invaders, and crush any internal strife that may arise.  In failed 
states, this type of territorial control allows the terrorist organization the ability to fill the 
security gap within a state.  
Seizing cities and villages throughout the state strengthens a terrorist 
organizations hold over territory.  It is one thing to control the land surrounding a city, 
but control over the city itself is an accomplishment that solidifies control over the 
territory surrounding it.  The seizure of urban centers within the state allows the terrorist 
organization to drive out political and military opponents, and serves to weaken these 
opponents by not allowing them access to resources and the population that they need in 
order to continue fighting.  While the regime put in place by the terrorist organizations 
may not be fair, open, and democratic, the citizens are provided some level of security 
from outside threats.   
The Taliban completed such tasks from 1996 until 2001 when the United States 
invaded and ousted them as rulers of the state.  By 1996, the Taliban had expanded their 
territorial control from just the Kandahar province in the southern region of the state to a 
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vast majority of the state’s total territory.  During this expansion, they effectively drove 
away warlords who had claimed power and, assumed control of the state government.  It 
was not until a far superior United States military invaded that the Taliban lost control 
over all this territory.  As far as threats in the region were concerned though, the Taliban 
were more than capable of providing security against them. 
Ability to police territory once taken is extremely important.  While the military 
can serve as a deterrent from internal uprising, it is not their job to deter crime and 
lawlessness.  The ability to police internally provides extra security to the citizens of the 
state and further allows the terrorist organization to work towards filling the security gap. 
Problematically, with a number of modern terrorist organizations, this self-policing 
results in harsh treatment of offenders under somewhat archaic laws that apply merciless 
punishment for rather menial crimes.   
During their time of dominance in Afghanistan, the Taliban ruthlessly policed the 
people.  Anyone found committing a crime was swiftly and harshly dealt with, without 
opportunity to plead innocence.  The Taliban also implemented harsh Sharia Law within 
the state that went as far as commanding the type of clothing women could wear.  This 
required that they be covered from head to toe with no skin showing.  Women who did 
not meet these criteria were harshly punished, with some even being put to death.  ISIL 
currently exhibits a similar capability for policing, however they themselves are the threat 
to the people.  Their policing is so cruel that, even if the citizens are protected from 
outside threats, they face a similar or even worse threat from ISIL.  Just as with military 
capabilities, the simple ability to police is taken into consideration, not the record the 
organization holds currently. 
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Each of the gaps has been prescribed a set of criteria to be met in order to fill 
them.  Using these, terrorist organizations are evaluated, classified, and placed in the 
appropriate classification tier.   It might be assumed that terrorist organizations 
completing these goals is itself the cause of state failure.  While it is true that terrorist 
organizations and other separatist groups can cause instability, this study assumes that 
these terrorist organizations would be operating in states that are already failed, therefore 
their completion of such activities would not contribute to the failure of the state.  This 
does point out, however, that terrorist organizations are grave threats to state stability in a 
number of cases and must be dealt with swiftly.  Using this classification system will 
allow policy makers to identify these groups and attack to stop them from accomplishing 
such goals.         
Constructing the Classification System 
 Each terrorist organization is classified based upon its ability to meet the criteria 
to fill any of the three gaps.  The criteria, as discussed above are scored as one point each 
and a terrorist organization must score two points to be considered able to fill the gap.  
From here, each organization is placed in the four-tiered structure to separate and classify 
them.  This section fully examines the structure of the classification, scoring system, and 
provides insight into the classification process. 
 The structure of the classification is a four-tiered structure reliant on the number 
of a gaps a terrorist organization is able to fill.  Organizations that are unable to fill any of  
the gaps are placed in the bottom-most tier, Tier 1.  Those that are able to fill at least one 
of the gaps, regardless of which, are placed into Tier 2.  Tier 3 holds those organizations 
that are able to fill two of the gaps.  Finally, Tier 4 holds those that are able to fill all 
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three of the gaps.  For Tiers 2 and 3, terrorist organizations are labeled to represent which 
of the gaps they are able to feel.  For capacity the label is a C, for legitimacy L, and for 
security S.   
 The criteria in each gap offer a possible total score of three points (Table 1).  A 
terrorist organization must score at least two points to be considered able to fill the gap.  
For the capacity gap, a half point is awarded for controlling any major state resource, a 
point and a half is split between the three services listed so each is worth one-third of a 
point, and half a point is awarded for controlling the major transportation routes of the 
state and a half point for controlling a utilities provider for a total of three points.  For 
legitimacy, a point is awarded for ethnic similarities and political participation while both 
the worldview and political ideological congruence are worth .5 points.  For security, one 
point is awarded for military capability, one half point for controlling a portion of the 
state’s territory, one half point for controlling a major city, and one point for having the 
capability to police the state.  Any combination of points that amount to two points in the 
gap suggests the terrorist organization can fill it. 
Table 1 
Scoring Within the Gaps 
Capacity – 3 points  Legitimacy – 3 points  Security – 3 points 
Resource control – .5 
Goods and Services  
• Health – .5 
• Welfare 
Ethnic Similarities – 1 
Worldview Congruence – .5  
Political Ideological 
Congruence – .5   
Military Capability – 1 
Territorial Control 
• Land Control – .5 
• Major City – .5 
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Table 1 (continued) 
• Emer. Relief – .5 
Infrastructural Control 
• Transportation 
Routes – .5 
Utilities Providers – .5 
Political Participation – 1 • Policing 
Capability – 1 
 
Conclusion 
 The new classification of terrorist organizations presented by this thesis is 
presented.  Using Call’s model of state failure, a set of criteria are developed.  To fill a 
capacity gap, a terrorist organization needs to control resources, provide services, and 
hold key infrastructure in the state.  The legitimacy gap is filled by sharing an ethnic 
heritage, a worldview congruence, and actively participating in the states political 
processes.  The security gap can be closed by having an established military, controlling 
territory within the state, and having the ability to police within the state.   
Using these, a scoring system is put into place that terrorist organizations can be 
evaluated by to ascertain whether or not they can fill a particular gap.  By scoring at least 
two points for a gap, a terrorist organization is considered able to fill the gap.  Based on 
the number of gaps they can fill, they are placed in the appropriate tier.  Using this 
classification system allows researchers and policy makers alike to glean a new 
understanding of terrorist organizations and begin developing solutions to the problems 
they and state failure may cause. 
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CHAPTER V 
CASE STUDY 
 To show the operation of the classification system, three terrorist organizations 
are used as case study.  The FARC, Hezbollah, and the LTTE are examined in depth to 
ascertain their classification and ability to fill each of the gaps.  For each, a brief history 
of the organization and their activities within their state is explored.  Based upon this, 
they are scored according to the criteria set forth in the previous chapter and then placed 
in the appropriate tier.  The conclusion of the chapter also addresses some of the findings 
related to this classification and their impact on the study of terrorism. 
 Due to a lack of data regarding terrorist organizations, this study is limited to a 
small number of cases.  The terrorist organizations evaluated do not reside within failed 
states but the case studies take their activities within their current state into account, and 
assumes they would act in a similar fashion within a failed state.  Through using these 
cases as examples to express the usefulness of the classification attention is drawn to the 
necessity for further data collection.  While these cases are merely a theoretical 
examination, they efficiently and effectively demonstrate the appropriateness of the 
classification presented. 
FARC 
 The FARC were formed in the 1960s as a Marxist/Communist paramilitary 
organization in Colombia.  Their creation was driven by the loss of land by hundreds of 
thousands of Colombians due to the decision of Colombian elites to move towards an 
agrarian society whose primary source of income would be large, industrialized farms 
and ranches (Domina and Berecz 2014).  From their creation to the present day, the 
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organization uses terrorist tactics to combat the Colombian government and civilians that 
support the state.   
 The organization has fielded membership of up to ten thousand.  Recent years 
have seen a decline in membership as the Colombian military has removed or killed a 
number of high ranking leaders and officials with the group.  The organization is 
primarily funded through practices of extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, and 
narcotics trade (Renwick and Hanson 2013; Domina and Berecz 2014).  They are 
responsible for a large percentage of the state’s cocaine trade and rake in millions, if not 
billions in income annually.   
 At times, the FARC have controlled upwards of one-third of the state’s territory.  
However, as Colombia is home to dense jungle that makes up a large portion of the 
state’s territory, this is not an impressive feat.  Control of the territory does offer the 
organization a safe and nearly impossible-to-navigate maze of hideouts and staging areas.  
This land allows them to coordinate guerrilla warfare against the state but they are unable 
to match the state sponsored military in manpower and weaponry.   
 Outside of control over heavily vegetated jungle territory, the FARC holds no 
territory that inhibits the state’s function or that would allow them to be influential in 
state politics.  Outside of scattered villages, there are no major cities or major transport 
routes in the territory.  Those villages are of no threat to the FARC and are kept in line 
through threats and fear.  State military and police forces are able to access these villages, 
but are unlikely to get information from anyone due to the fear of reprisal.   
 There is no evidence to support the idea that the FARC offers any kind of goods 
and services to those in the state either.  The organization is much more worried with 
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progressing the Marxist/Communist ideology and bringing about the collapse of the 
Colombian government than they are with the well being and benefit of the citizens of the 
state.  The ideology that drives the organization’s activities also serves to separate them 
from the citizenry of the state because democracy and capitalism are perceived as 
preferable and acceptable than the antiquated and failed Soviet ideology that resonated 
throughout the Cold War.  They do, however, share an ethnic heritage with the citizens of 
the state. 
The FARC are not able to fill any of the gaps and are therefore classified as a Tier 
1 terrorist organization (Table 2).  They score 0 points in the capacity gap due to their 
lack of control over state resource, provision of goods and services, and infrastructural 
control.  They score 1 point in the legitimacy gap for matching the ethnic heritage of the 
citizens of the state.  Finally, they score .5 points in the security gap for controlling 
territory, which may be a generous allocation of a score seeing that the territory 
controlled is mostly meaningless as far as state functions go.             
Table 2 
Scoring the FARC 
Capacity – 0  Legitimacy – 1  Security – .5   
The organization is unable 
to accomplish any of the 
prescribed criteria 
Ethnic similarities – 1  Territorial Control 
• Territory – .5  
 
 
 
  
66
Hezbollah 
 Hezbollah came to existence during the Lebanese civil war that took place from 
1975-1990, and was the result of Israeli invasion and occupation, and were formed as a 
militia group with the aid of Iran (Anderson and Sloan 1995).  Lebanon had served as a 
base of operations for Palestinian terrorist organizations such as the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel invaded in an attempt to flush out these 
organizations and destroy them.  Hezbollah rose as a voice to stand against the presence 
of Western and Israeli influence in Lebanese affairs, and, more broadly, in the Middle 
East.  They did not call for an independent Lebanese state but instead desired to 
incorporate Lebanon into a larger, more encompassing Islamic State that would envelope 
the entire region (Hamzeh 1993).  This ideology has shifted in recent years to simply 
securing an independent and sovereign Lebanese state.       
The organization was able to garner support from the newly installed Iranian 
government that resulted from the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979.  Iranian leadership 
saw the organization and its young revolutionary leadership as a possible outlet for 
spreading the idea of Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East (Norton 2014).  The 
Iranian government supplied a hefty amount of money and military training to the 
members of the organization.  Iran’s support for the organization continues to this day 
with nearly $200 million in financial support annually (Masters and Laub 2014).  The 
organization also draws financial support from a number of local sponsors, as well as 
securing income through criminal activities such as smuggling and narcotics trade. 
Since its creation in the mid-1980s, the organization has garnered considerable 
political clout and is actively involved in the political processes of the state.  Currently, 
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they hold ten seats in the Lebanese Parliament and have two party members serving in 
the Cabinet.  The organization’s Shia base allows them to potentially hold a high and 
influential position in the state government as the Speaker of Parliament is required to be 
Shia.  The Shia based population of the state find a strong voice with Hezbollah and 
provide massive amounts of support for the organization. In return, Hezbollah’s 
organizational structure and purpose are geared towards the care of the Shia population as 
well as building a stable Lebanese state that is free of outside influence, namely influence 
of the Western world.    
The Worldwide Terrorist List 2014 produced by the Athena Institute, describes 
Hezbollah as an organization that “run[s] charities, hospitals, schools and implements 
effective polices in territories they control to combat poverty and other social issues” 
(Domina and Berecz 2014, 30).  This in particular has led to the successes Hezbollah has 
enjoyed in political elections.  The organization has a number of committees devoted to 
services provision such as the committees for: power, water, health, financial aid, and the 
environment (Hamzeh 1993).  As pointed out by Flannigan (2008), they maintain and 
control very highly touted service providers within the state, which helps to alleviate the 
shortcomings of the state to provide such goods.  Also, they provide emergency relief and 
aid to those who need it within their territories.  The goods and services provision 
constitutes a large portion of the objectives of the organization.  Their control over power 
and water resources gives them considerable influence over the infrastructure of the state 
as well. 
Hezbollah maintains an active military and security division as well.  As of 2014, 
they organized and maintain what is one of the largest non-state militaries in the world.  
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Their military consists of thousands of members who serve on a full-time or voluntary 
basis (Domina and Berecz 2014).  Through this they are able to maintain control of the 
territories in which they rule and actively engage in regular combat with Israel and other 
actors they see to be credible threats to the security of Lebanon and its people.  Further, 
their military capabilities are such that they can devote troops to fight for the Assad 
regime in Syria, although this is showing signs of being detrimental to their cause.         
Numerous agreements exist to demilitarize and disarm militant groups in 
Lebanon, but Hezbollah has managed to avoid such action.  U.N. Resolution 1559 
ordered the disbanding and disarmament of all militant groups within the state, both 
Lebanese and non-Lebanese, yet Hezbollah has remained armed by calling themselves a 
resistance group instead of a militant group.  This provides immediate security concerns 
for Israel and concerns for regional stability by other world powers.  In Lebanon, the 
Hezbollah support for the Assad regime has led to Sunni led reprisal attacks that have 
cost the lives of some Shia civilians.  By refusing to disarm and disband their military 
forces, the organization maintains a sizable and formidable military presence that worries 
policy makers and state leaders alike. 
The organization also shares a similar ethnic heritage with those of the state.  
While the Sunni and the Shia populations adhere to slightly different religious ideology, 
they share an ethnic heritage.  Importantly though are the similarities between the Shia 
population and Hezbollah.  This allows Hezbollah to identify themselves with a portion 
of the population which results in their election and rise to power.  Through its military 
campaigns against Israel, Hezbollah is able to bring itself closer to the Sunni population  
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despite their philosophical difference.  The organization therefore shares a worldview and 
political ideological congruence with the citizens of the state. 
 Using this information, Hezbollah is scored and classified as a Tier 4 terrorist 
organization, able to fill all three gaps (Table 3).  For the capacity gap, they receive a 
score of 2 for their provision of health, welfare, emergency aid and relief, and control 
over utilities provision within the state.  For legitimacy, they receive 3 points because 
they meet all criteria for filling the gap.  Because of their military capability, land control, 
and policing capabilities within the state, they receive a score of 2.5 for the security gap.  
Hezbollah is therefore able to fill all three gaps.  
 Table 3 
Scoring Hezbollah  
Capacity – 2 points Legitimacy – 3 points Security – 2.5 points 
Goods and Services  
• Health – .5   
• Welfare – .5   
• Emer. Relief – .5  
Infrastructural Control 
• Utilities - .5 
Ethnic Similarities – 1 
Worldview Congruence – .5 
Political Ideological 
Congruence – .5  
Political Participation – 1 
 
Military Capability – 1 
Territorial Control  
• Territorial Control – 
.5  
Policing Capability – 1  
 
 
LTTE 
 The LTTE operate on the island nation of Sri Lanka.  The organization formed in 
the early 1970s and began carrying out terrorist attacks in the mid-1970s.  Primarily, the 
organization acted in the desire to create a separate and independent state for the minority 
  
70
Tamils within Sri Lanka (Flanigan 2008).  Their attacks targeted the Sri Lankan people 
and Tamils that were not supportive of a separate Tamil state.  For a number of years they 
were engaged in outright civil war with the Sinhalese government.  They carried out 
numerous attacks, inflicting heavy casualties on not only the Sinhalese military, but also 
the people of the state and the Indian army when they were deployed to help ensure peace 
in the mid-1980s.   
 The organization continued armed engagement with the Sinhalese state until they 
were defeated in a decisive manner in 2009.  During this time, they fielded a military 
capacity between 10,000 to 15,000 members strong as well as police forces to maintain 
order in the territory they controlled in the northern and the eastern portions of the state.  
The LTTE commands special interest in regards to their military capabilities as they are 
the only terrorist organization to command a three branched military outfit.  They were 
the only terrorist in the world to have operational army, navy, and air force (Domina and 
Berecz 2014).  It wasn’t until their defeat that they lost control of these territories and the 
Sinhalese government took over control.  For the purposes of this study, the organization 
is assessed before their defeat in 2009 to ascertain how they should be classified to 
further demonstrate the operationalization of the classification system. 
 The LTTE openly engaged in combat with the Sri Lankan government on 
numerous occasions as well as engaging the Indian army.  They were successful in many 
of these engagements and were able to forcibly maintain their control over their held 
territory.  They were able to elicit support and troops for their military forces for these 
conflicts through coercion and by championing the Tamil minority.  It was dangerous to 
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be a Tamil that was not supportive of the LTTE and its mission as that drastically 
increased the chances that a terrorist attack would be targeted at those who were not.   
 The LTTE served as the de facto government of the northern and eastern sectors 
of the state for well over two decades.  They established the leadership of the state, 
maintained a government structure with officials, and worked on behalf of the Tamil 
people.  Through this governmental setup, the LTTE provided a police force, court 
systems, and other wings to perform various administrative functions (Flanigan 2008).  
They were not able to function as a state would in the international community due to a 
lack of international recognition, but they were able to maintain control over the regions 
they held. 
 Goods and services provision is handled through various NGOs and the LTTE 
departments of health and education (Stokke 2006).  The organization provides some 
services to the populous but the majority is done through regional and international 
NGOs.  Through these NGOs services like medical care, welfare, and community 
building are offered.  Some of the NGOs are related to the LTTE but there is not enough 
evidence to support the claim that the LTTE provided the goods and services. The 
organization did work to secure the aid of the NGOs, however, but this speaks more to 
the legitimacy and influence of the organization rather than their ability to provide goods 
and services. 
 The organization held control over the utilities services in the territory of the state 
that they controlled.  They also controlled and monitored the major transportation routes 
through the portion of the state they resided in.  This allowed for the control over trade 
and influence over the productivity of the territory.  This further allowed the LTTE to 
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combat the state without interference when operating in their own territory because they 
had the freedom of mobility and the means for mass production.     
 The LTTE share a similar ethnic heritage with the minority Tamils of the state, 
but share little to none with the Sinhalese population.  However, these ties are much 
stronger with the minority Tamils.  Because the organization’s primary objective is to 
establish an independent and sovereign Tamil state it is safe to assume that they more 
closely associate themselves as Tamils.  This similarity provides great amounts of 
support among the Tamil community but serves to alienate them from the Sinhalese 
population.  Unlike Hezbollah, they do not engage in activities that endear them to a 
majority of the state’s population even though they belong to a separated or dissimilar 
ethnic heritage.  The organization also prescribes to the Hindu religion, which is different 
than nearly 80% of the state’s population, which are Buddhist.  Their objective of the 
independent Tamil state excludes them from sharing a political ideological congruence 
with the state because of it not being a widespread political desire within the state. 
 The LTTE is classified as a Tier 2 organization able to fill only one gap (Table 4).  
The organization is awarded 1 point for the capacity gap due to their control over utilities 
providers and major transportation routes however they do not meet the 2 point threshold 
needed to earn consideration as able to fill the gap.  They are unable to fill the legitimacy 
gap as they are unable to complete any of the prescribed criteria meriting a score of 0 for 
the gap.  Because of their overwhelming military forces that includes an army, navy, and 
air force, their control over territory and major cities, and their ability to police the 
territory they hold, they are awarded 3 points for the security gap signaling their ability to 
fill it.  They are therefore a Tier 2 S terrorist organization. 
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Table 4 
Scoring the LTTE  
Capacity – 1 Legitimacy – 0  Security – 3  
Infrastructural Control 
• Transportation 
Routes – .5 
• Utilities – .5   
The organization is unable 
to accomplish any of the 
prescribed criteria 
Military Capability – 1 
Territorial Control 
• Control of Territory 
– .5  
• Control of major 
city – .5 
Policing capabilities – 1  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows the ability, or lack thereof, of terrorist organizations to fill the 
gaps.  Importantly, this confirms the main hypothesis of the study that terrorist 
organizations are able to engage in activities that can stabilize failed states.  By filling 
these gaps they are providing the foundation to reestablish the state and the 
underpinnings of government, providing the security needed to protect the state, or are 
providing the care that citizens need to exist.  The difficult question that must be asked 
now is whether these organizations need to be disbanded, destroyed, or contained.  
 The distinction between those terrorist organizations that act benevolently and 
those that act malevolently, must be taken into consideration.  A group like Hezbollah, 
even if engaging in terrorist activity outside of the state, poses to do more good for the 
citizens of the state and the overall stability of its political structures than does ISIL.  
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Therefore this classification presents researchers and policy makers with a decision.  
Should some of these groups be allowed to operate, under containment and with some 
oversight, or should we continue to develop blanket policy to combat terrorism on a 
global scale without taking into consideration that these organizations might be doing 
more to help the state in which they operate more than any NGO or another state may?  
Sadly, it is not within the scope or intentions of this study to answer this question now, 
but it must be taken into consideration and is suggested for future study.   
 The FARC, Hezbollah, and LTTE are offered as case study and example 
classifications to accomplish a number of goals.  First, this shows how the scoring system 
for the classification works and the placement of terrorist organizations into the tiered 
structure works.  This also establishes that terrorist organizations can and do operate in 
constructively.  The reason for this constructive activity is outside of the scope of this 
study, however.  Importantly, these case studies exemplify the usefulness of the 
classification system and provide the framework for future research and data collection.     
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
  The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the linkages between failed states and 
terrorist organizations.  In particular, the ability of terrorist organizations to stabilize 
failed states is evaluated.  Results show that there are some terrorist organizations that are 
indeed capable of stabilizing these states.  However, no indication is given as to whether 
these results are fleeting or long-term.  Importantly though, this provides an intimate look 
into the positive capabilities of terrorist organizations outside of their destructive 
capabilities showing that they are capable of positive activity that is beneficial to the 
citizens of a state.  Terrorist organizations are examined due to their use of violence to 
meet political goals unlike NGOs who are limited due to constraints placed on them by 
the host state and the international community.  
 State failure stems from a number of issues.  Economic struggles, political 
corruption, and ethnic tensions are but just a few within a long list of other causes.  These 
are particularly important, however, because they are eerily similar to the factors that 
influence the genesis of terrorism within a state.  The alarming number of domestic 
terrorist attacks within these states alone merits the academic inquiry offered due to the 
high number of domestic terrorist attacks that occur within states in the top 10 of the 
Fragile States Index.  As a number of international organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations, and states have attempted to stabilize and “fix the failed”, new approaches 
must be taken.  It is for this reason that this thesis evaluates the capabilities of terrorist 
organizations to engage in such activity.   
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 The role of these terrorist organizations in these states sometimes runs much 
deeper than their attacks, however.  Organizations like Hezbollah operate in struggling 
states and provide an impressive number of social services, governmental legitimacy, and 
security to the people of the state all the while resorting to terrorist tactics to achieve a 
number of their goals.  This underlies the idea that there is always political motive behind 
terrorist attacks.  In many instances, Hezbollah uses terrorism as a way to ward off threats 
to the security of Lebanon as well as protecting the state’s citizens from outside invaders.   
 Terrorist organizations take many forms throughout the world.  It is neither the 
objective nor intent of this study to debate the intrinsic good or evil nature of such 
organizations.  That said, there is a distinct benevolent/malevolent nature to the activities 
of terrorist organizations.  While some terrorist organizations act in order to be the voice 
for a minority, or are attempting to rectify social injustices within a state, others are much 
more nefarious.  For example, the goal of ISIL is not to be the advocate for an 
underprivileged population and champion their cause, they use terror because they wish 
to destroy all they disagree with and replace it with a new, even more repressive and 
intolerant regime than those that stand.  These organizations may meet the criteria to fill 
any of the gaps, but by no means are able to stabilize a failed state because they wish to 
destroy the state they are in.       
The classification presented provides significant insight into the positive 
capabilities of terrorist organizations.  Through evaluation of the abilities to meet a 
number of criteria, terrorist organizations are judged on abilities that are believed to 
influence a positive outcome of state building.  The four-tiered structure provides a 
classification structure that allows for the separation of terrorist organizations so that 
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those that are more capable are set apart from those that are not capable.  Provided this 
information, academics and policy makers alike can synthesize new information about 
these terrorist organizations that can aid in the development of competent and sound 
policy.  Through an understanding of what strengths these groups outside of their ability 
to commit terrorist acts, a new dimension of these organizations rarely explored is 
exposed. 
As policy makers begin taking these positive abilities into account, a more direct 
and effective policy to combat these organizations can be developed.  Since the start of 
the Global War on Terrorism in 2001, the nearly universal policy to deal with terrorist 
organizations is to combat them physically in an attempt to eradicate them.  This thesis 
provides insight how to instead build policy directed at eliminating the social conditions 
that allow terrorist organizations to gain popularity and support among the citizens of a 
state.  By addressing these pressing issues and understanding what allows these 
organizations to garner support in states, policymakers can stymie the growth of terrorist 
organizations and in the meanwhile, bolster the failing states of the world.              
 The scoring criteria were the recipients of much thought and consideration.  Each 
have some tie to the expected responsibilities of a state.  Failed states are unable to 
complete such tasks or simply forgo them even if they have the ability in many cases.  
This allows non-state actors such as terrorist organizations to step up and provide leading 
to a growth in their influence and power.  By dividing terrorist organizations into the 
tiered structure, their role within not only the failed state, but in other states is 
distinguished and is set forth for further evaluation by future studies. 
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 The three case studies provided exemplify the various constructive traits a 
terrorist organization can possess.  From the capability to provide citizens of the state 
with goods and services to the ability to field a sizable military force, these organizations 
are capable of a wide array of activities.  The same scoring technique and etiquette can be 
applied to any terrorist organization throughout the world.  The results will obviously 
vary, but even for those that are unable to fill any of the gaps insight is offered into what 
they are capable of.  Through an understanding these positive capabilities, policy makers 
can make relevant and tailored policy decisions designed to stymie the growth of these 
organizations and eradicate the need for their resort to terrorist activity.   
The constructive abilities of these organizations is incredible.  The ability of 
Hezbollah to fill all three gaps is astounding because many are so quick to assume that a 
terrorist organization cannot possible be capable of positive activity.  Terrorist 
organizations are much more complex than we would like to believe.  They are 
sometimes state builders in disguise, and there is often more to them than meets the eye.  
A growing number of studies touch on this, but the effort must be increased.  Results of 
these studies may not only tell us more about the positive influence these organizations 
have, but also give more insight as to why they choose the tactics they do.         
 This thesis was limited to three case studies due to a lack of information regarding 
many terrorist organizations.  The lack of data results from the perceived irrelevance of 
an organization or simply the inability to gather such data presently.  Further, even 
though state failure still undergoes academic inquiry, there are any combination of issues 
that may instigate the onset of a failure situation that researchers have yet to understand.  
The classification system presented is based off of current knowledge regarding failure 
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and should and will be updated as the knowledge surrounding the topic continues to 
grow.  
 Provided more detailed information on any number of the world’s terrorist 
organizations, there is expectation that this study shall be expanded in the future.  With 
the information presented, the positive relationship a terrorist organization potentially can 
have with a state is shown and begs for further study.  This thesis highlights the glaring 
lack of knowledge regarding this relationship and provides the guidance to close the gap.  
 State failure and terrorism are pressing matters that are interrelated.  This thesis 
provides insight into this relationship as well as paves the way for further research.  As 
we learn more about both of these phenomena, their causes, and their relationships, 
security of the state, the region, and the international community can be bolstered for the 
good of all.  
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